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The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  assessing  the  stability  and  security  of  the  framework  for  peace  in  Northern  Ireland,  lessons 
that  have  been  learnt  through  its  evolution,  and  recommendations  for  the  future.  As  shall  be  seen,  the  Northern  Ireland 
framework  for  peace  today  is  not  stable  and  secure  for  the  future. 

The  complexity  of  the  problem  begins  with  the  number  of  actors  involved:  the  nationalist  and  unionist  people,  the  British 
and  Irish  governments  and  the  military,  including  the  Republican  and  Loyalist  paramilitaries  and  the  mix  of  Security 
Forces.  The  most  difficult  challenge  for  the  peace  process  has  been  to  manage  the  complex  and  non-linear  interplay  of 
these  actors.  The  mutually  exclusive  Republican  and  Loyalist  nationalisms  remain  unresolved,  co-existing  in  tension. 

The  1998  Belfast  Agreement  established  a  framework  for  channeling  these  conflicting  interests,  but  does  not  guarantee 

There  are  violent  and  non-violent  forces  that  threaten  the  integrity  of  the  framework  for  peace.  These  include 
Republican  efforts  to  de-stabilize  the  process,  the  division  of  the  unionist  movement,  the  divisive  effects  of  historical 
enquiries,  the  difficulties  in  reforming  the  police  service  and  the  criminal  justice  system,  and  implementing 
demilitarization.  Dissident  Republican  threats  to  security  and  poor  economic  performance  are  the  most  significant  forces 
today.  There  has  been  a  persistent  rise  in  dissident  Republican  terrorism  since  2007.  The  dissidents’  are  determined  to 
remain  relevant  to  the  nationalist  community.  Their  use  of  criminal  enterprises  and  terrorist  activity  has  brought  a  rise  in 
Republican  violence,  a  potent  combination  of  political  significance.  The  Northern  Ireland  economy  has  grown  more 
slowly  than  any  other  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  depends  heavily  on  dwindling  public  expenditure  and  grants. 
Northern  Ireland  must  provide  greater  economic  self-reliance  and  development  with  sustainable  growth  and  prosperity. 

Standard  Form  298  (Rev.  8-98) 
Prescribed  by  ANSI-Std  Z39-18 


USMC  Command  and  Staff  College 
Marine  Corps  University 
2076  South  Street 
Quantico,  VA  221 34-5068 











3.  DATES  COVERED  (From  -  To) 
jper  September  2011 -April  2012 




Master  of  Military  Studies  Research  F 


The  Northern  Ireland  Framework  for  Peace:  Terrorism  and  its  Aftermath 

6.  AUTHOR(S) 
Urry,  Simon  R. 




To  combat  these  forces  have  been  a  strong  civic  society  and 

The  Northern  Ireiand  peace  process  wiii  become  ever  reiiant 
morai  authority,  to  keep  on  its  path  to  peace.  In  order  to  ove 
provide  a  stabie  and  secure  future,  the  Northern  Ireiand  Assi 
in  the  Beifast  Agreement  and  address  the  criticai  security  an^ 
seeks  a  secure  and  stabie  future. 

their  eventuai  distaste  for  terrorism,  vioience  and  hatred. 

on  the  strong  civii  society  of  Northern  Ireiand,  and  their 
rcome  the  disruptive  forces  that  threaten  the  framework  and 
jmbiy  must  overcome  the  weakness  in  governance  inherent 
t  economic  chaiienges.  A  reformed  Northern  Ireiand  stiii 


Northern  Ireiand;  Peace  Process;  Terrorism;  Insurgei 
Decommissioning;  British  Army;  Dissident  Repubiicans;  PIR/ 

icy;  Counter-Terrorism;  Counter-Insurgency;  Reconciliation; 
V;  Loyalists; 


ABSTRACT  OF  F  AGES  Marine  Corps  University  /  Command  and  Staff  College 

- 1 - 1 - - 

a.  REPORT  I  b.  ABSTRACT  |c.  THIS  PAGE  19b.  TELEPONE  NUMBER  (Include  area  code) 

Unclass  I  Unclass  I  Unclass  (703)  784-3330  (Admin  Office) 

STANDARD  FORM  298  Back  (Rev.  8/98) 

Table  of  Contents 




























DI  -D5 


El  -E3 






HI  -H9 


II  -14 


JI  -  J3 


KI  -K3 




I  -4 


I  -5 









During  my  military  career  I  have  spent  more  of  my  military  eareer  in  Northern  Ireland 
than  anywhere  else.  I  have  covered  the  range  and  seope  of  military  operations,  from 
Conventional  Patrolling  in  the  eounty  of  South  Armagh,  to  Speeial  Surveillanee  and 
Reeonnaissanee  aeross  the  Provinee  of  Northern  Ireland,  and  served  in  every  offieer  rank 

up  to  and  ineluding  Major. 

I  have  found  Ireland  intriguing.  Its  history,  identity  and  eharm  have  influeneed  me  and 
played  a  formative  role  in  my  military  leadership  experiences  and  operational  serviee.  I 
have  focused  my  researeh  on  the  future  trends  rather  than  the  past  because  Northern 
Ireland  will  faee  greater  difficulty  in  the  future  than  it  has  since  the  Belfast  Agreement  of 


It  is  said  that  no  prudent  Englishman  should  write  about  Irish  affairs.  I  chose  this  topic  as 
I  have  partieipated  and  read  about  actions  there  without  fully  understanding  or 
appreeiating  aetions  and  signifioanee.  My  operational  serviee  in  Northern  Ireland  has 
shaped  my  professional  development  and  developed  my  approaeh  to  military  leadership. 
The  issue  of  Northern  Ireland  remains  at  the  forefront  of  the  British  domestie  polities. 
The  National  Security  Strategy  2010  (NSS)  gives  Northern  Ireland  priority.  I  hope  that 
by  analyzing  the  future  rather  than  past,  this  paper  ean  add  value  to  future  military 
professionals  about  to  embark  on  operations  either  in  Northern  Ireland  or  in  a  similar 

eonfliot  elsewhere. 

This  is  a  eontemporary  topie  that  is  eonstantly  evolving.  This  factual  and 
analytical  interpretation  is  aeeurate  as  at  April  2012. 


Executive  Summary 

Title:  The  Northern  Ireland  Framework  for  Peace:  Terrorism  and  its  Aftermath. 

Author:  Major  Simon  Urry  MBE  Royal  Marines. 

Thesis:  The  Northern  Ireland  peace  process  today  is  not  a  stable  and  secure  framework 
for  peace  in  the  future. 

Discussion:  The  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  assessing  the  stability  and  security  of  the 
framework  for  peace  in  Northern  Ireland,  lessons  that  have  been  learnt  through  its 
evolution,  and  recommendations  for  the  future.  As  shall  be  seen,  the  Northern  Ireland 
framework  for  peace  today  is  not  stable  and  secure  for  the  future. 

The  complexity  of  the  problem  begins  with  the  number  of  actors  involved:  the 
nationalist  and  unionist  people,  the  British  and  Irish  governments  and  the  military, 
including  the  Republican  and  Loyalist  paramilitaries  and  the  mix  of  Security  Forces.  The 
most  difficult  challenge  for  the  peace  process  has  been  to  manage  the  complex  and  non¬ 
linear  interplay  of  these  actors.  The  mutually  exclusive  Republican  and  Loyalist 
nationalisms  remain  unresolved,  co-existing  in  tension.  The  1998  Belfast  Agreement 
established  a  framework  for  channeling  these  conflicting  interests,  but  does  not  guarantee 

There  are  violent  and  non-violent  forces  that  threaten  the  integrity  of  the 
framework  for  peace.  These  include  Republican  efforts  to  de-stabilize  the  process,  the 
division  of  the  unionist  movement,  the  divisive  effects  of  historical  enquiries,  the 
difficulties  in  reforming  the  police  service  and  the  criminal  justice  system,  and 
implementing  demilitarization.  Dissident  Republican  threats  to  security  and  poor 
economic  performance  are  the  most  significant  forces  today.  There  has  been  a  persistent 
rise  in  dissident  Republican  terrorism  since  2007.  The  dissidents’  are  determined  to 
remain  relevant  to  the  nationalist  community.  Their  use  of  criminal  enterprises  and 
terrorist  activity  has  brought  a  rise  in  Republican  violence,  a  potent  combination  of 
political  significance.  The  Northern  Ireland  economy  has  grown  more  slowly  than  any 
other  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  depends  heavily  on  dwindling  public  expenditure 
and  grants.  Northern  Ireland  must  provide  greater  economic  self-reliance  and 
development  with  sustainable  growth  and  prosperity.  To  combat  these  forces  have  been  a 
strong  civic  society  and  their  eventual  distaste  for  terrorism,  violence  and  hatred. 

Conclusion:  The  Northern  Ireland  peace  process  will  become  ever  reliant  on  the  strong 
civil  society  of  Northern  Ireland,  and  their  moral  authority,  to  keep  on  its  path  to  peace. 

In  order  to  overcome  the  disruptive  forces  that  threaten  the  framework  and  provide  a 
stable  and  secure  future,  the  Northern  Ireland  Assembly  must  overcome  the  weakness  in 
governance  inherent  in  the  Belfast  Agreement  and  address  the  critical  security  and 
economic  challenges.  A  reformed  Northern  Ireland  still  seeks  a  secure  and  stable  future. 


The  complexity  of  the  Northern  Ireland  problem  begins  with  the  number  of  actors 
involved:  the  nationalist  and  unionist  people,  the  British  and  Irish  governments  and  the 
military,  including  the  Republican  and  Loyalist  paramilitaries  and  the  mix  of  Security 
Forces. '  The  most  difficult  challenge  for  the  peace  process  has  been  to  manage  the 
complex  and  non-linear  interplay  of  these  actors.  The  1998  Belfast  Agreement 
established  a  framework  for  channeling  these  conflicting  interests.  The  Northern  Ireland 
framework  for  peace  today  is  not  yet  stable  and  secure  for  the  future  due  to  a  number  of 
violent  and  non-violent  forces,  but  principally  security  and  economic  influences. 

For  security,  there  has  been  a  rise  in  dissident  Republican  violence,  terrorism  and 
ambition  since  2007.  The  dissidents’  use  of  criminal  enterprises  and  terrorist  activity 
provides  both  a  potent  mix  for  support  and  capability  for  the  organization.  There  is 
significant  economic  instability.  Northern  Ireland  has  the  lowest  economic  activity  in  the 
United  Kingdom  (UK),  a  high  dependence  on  public  expenditure  and  grants,  and  a  6.9% 
reduction  in  funding  over  the  next  four  years  from  the  government’s  coalition  spending. 
Finally,  within  the  Northern  Irish  society,  mutually  exclusive  Republican  and  Loyalist 
nationalisms  have  not  yet  found  an  ability  to  forge  a  common  British-Irish  identity. 

This  paper  does  not  attempt  to  provide  a  detailed  history  of  the  Troubles,  as  the 
conflict  since  1969  became  euphemistically  known;  nor  is  it  an  account  of  the  policies  of 
successive  British  governments  towards  Northern  Ireland;  still  less  is  it  a  definitive 
record  of  the  operations  of  the  security  forces  and  their  battle  of  attrition  and 
containment.  Rather,  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  on  assessing  the  stability  and  security  of 
the  framework  for  peace  in  Northern  Ireland,  lessons  that  have  been  learnt  through  its 
evolution  and  recommendations  for  Northern  Ireland  or  a  similar  conflict  elsewhere. 


Overview  of  the  Troubles 

It  is  important  to  understand  the  baekground  and  eauses  of  the  eonfliet,  so  that 
their  implieations  for  the  present  and  the  future  framework  for  peaee  ean  be  realized. 
Although  Ireland  had  fallen  under  English  influenee  from  the  12*  eentury  Norman 
invasion,  it  has  only  been  offieially  part  of  the  United  Kingdom  sinee  the  Aet  of  Union  in 
1801.  The  IRA’s  Easter  Rising  of  1916  was  a  turning  point  in  Irish  history  that  led  to  the 
Anglo-Irish  War  of  1919  to  1921 .  The  eontinued  British  repression  of  Republiean 
politieal  expression  led  to  widespread  support  aeross  Ireland  for  the  Irish  rebels.  The 
1920  Government  of  Ireland  Aet  partitioned  Ireland  and  established  a  separate  Northern 
Ireland  that  ineluded  only  six  eounties  rather  than  the  aneient  nine-eounty  Provinee  of 
Ulster.  This  was  to  guarantee  a  Protestant  majority  in  the  north.  The  provineial 
government  of  the  eonservative  Ulster  Unionist  Party  (UUP)  then  eontrolled  Northern 
Ireland  for  the  next  fifty  years.  It  employed  its  own  dominanee  of  orangeism^  to  bind 
together  an  uneasy  elass  allianee  of  Unionist  eontrol  and  authority. 

In  the  late  1960s  a  eonglomerate  of  Catholies,  nationalists,  Republieans  and 
agnostie  soeialists,  along  with  a  handful  of  Protestants,  opposed  to  Unionist  dominanee, 


diserimination,  and  their  soeial  marginalization,  founded  the  Northern  Ireland  Civil 
Rights  Assoeiation  (NICRA).  It  was  designed  to  “bring  Northern  Ireland  effeetive 
demoeraey,  and  to  end  all  of  the  forms  of  injustiee,  intimidation,  diserimination  and 
deprivation,  whieh  result  from  the  partisan  rule  of  the  Stormont  regime.”"^  Although 
many  pereeived  this  as  a  peaeeful  eivil  rights  protest  movement,  the  minority  intended  to 
spark  eivil  unrest  and  anarehy,  using  dangerously  eonfrontational  taeties  to  draw  attention 


to  their  cause.  ^  This  catalyst  of  NICRA  protest  marches  mobilized  a  huge  swell  of 
Catholic  and  minority  support  to  redistribute  civil  rights  evenly  amongst  the  Protestant 
and  Catholic  communities.  Association  with  the  growing  militancy  of  the  Republican 
movement  tainted  NICRA,  as  the  Stormont  government  saw  NICRA  as  a  direct  threat  to 
its  own  authority  and  the  start  of  a  Republican  plot.^  When  the  nationalists  marched 
through  predominantly  Unionist  residential  areas,  it  sparked  a  counter  movement  by  the 
Protestants  and  evoked  heavy-handed  responses  by  militant  Loyalists,  elements  of  the 
RUC,  and  the  auxiliary  Ulster  Special  Constabulary  (USC,  or  ‘B’  Specials).’  Northern 
Ireland  spiraled  into  sectarian  clashes,  militancy,  vigilante  groups,  and  civil  disorder.  It 
fed  a  vicious  cycle.  The  turning  point  of  the  Troubles  was  in  August  1969,  when 
nationalists  targeted  the  Orangemen  march  in  Londonderry.  The  RUC  were  incapable  of 
controlling  unrest  across  Londonderry  and  Belfast  and  on  14  August  1969,  the  Home 
Secretary  James  Callaghan  answered  a  request  from  his  counterpart  in  the  Northern 
Ireland  government  at  Stormont  to  call  in  the  British  Army  for  help.  1969  started  the 
period  of  the  Troubles.  Twenty-nine  years  later,  the  1998  Belfast  Agreement  initiated  the 
start  of  the  peace  process.  The  destabilizing  influences  on  the  framework  for  peace  today 
have  historical  significance  (see  Appendix  A,  B,  D  &  E). 

Defining  the  Problem.  In  order  to  establish  a  framework  for  peace  in  1998,  the 
Northern  Ireland  problem  was  a  complex  of  social,  ethnic,  and  nationalist  issues  played 
out  by  many  actors  who  represented  the  diversity  of  Northern  Ireland  (see  Appendix  B). 
One  may  speak  of  three  main  protagonists:  the  people,  the  government,  and  the  military. 

-  The  People.  Within  its  borders  were  the  majority  Protestant  Unionist 
communities,  who  intended  to  keep  Northern  Ireland  within  the  United  Kingdom  and 


resisted  the  pereeived  threat  of  a  united  Ireland.  The  minority  Catholie  nationalist 
eommunities  either  pereeived  the  issue  as  a  nationalist  struggle  for  self-determination  or  a 
problem  of  eorruption  or  unfair  praetiees  by  sueeessive  Unionist  governments.  Both 
eommunities  have  had  to  withstand  the  indiseriminate  eharaeter  of  violenee,  polities  and 
allegianees,  demographie  segregation  of  Protestants  and  Catholies  within  eommunities, 
and  soeio-eeonomie  inequality,  entrenehed  from  bitterness  and  hatred  that  polarized  both 
eommunities  (see  Appendix  D).  The  stoie  people  of  Northern  Ireland  have  always 
provided  moral  authority  throughout  the  Troubles.  Communities  have  identified  what 
they  pereeived  as  just  and  fair,  resisted  marginalization,  foreed  aoeommodation  and 
ehange  that  eommunity  and  politieal  leaders  found  diffieult  to  overeome.  Religion  and 
demographies  have  not  been  sourees  of  the  eonfiiet  rather  they  have  reinforeed,  and  at 
times  aeted  as  a  eatalyst,  to  the  violenee  between  the  eommunities. 

-  The  Government,  The  internal  infiuenee  was  the  British  Government,  with  no 
strategie,  selfish,  or  eeonomie  interest  in  Northern  Ireland  but  instead  eommitted  to 
support  and  proteet  its  people  as  an  integral  part  of  the  United  Kingdom.  The  external 
infiuenee  was  the  Dublin  Government,  whieh  had  pledged  to  take  over  Northern  Ireland 
and  form  a  united  island  (see  Appendix  E  &  F).  Both  governments  sought  a  reasoned 
end  through  negotiation  and  politieal  settlement  rather  than  violenee  or  ehanee. 

-  The  Military,  The  military  is  split  between  the  paramilitaries  and  the  seeurity 
forees.  For  the  paramilitaries,  the  Irish  Republiean  Army  (IRA)  represented  the 
mainstream  Republiean  movement,  and  used  politieal  violenee  against  the  state  both 
internally  and  externally  (see  Appendix  I).  Proteeting  the  Unionist  eommunities  were  the 
Foyalist  paramilitaries,  the  defenders  of  their  Protestant  Ulster  (see  Appendix  J).  Caught 


between  the  violenee  and  hatred  of  the  eommunities  were  the  seeurity  forces:  the  Royal 
Ulster  Constabulary  (RUC),  the  locally  recruited  Ulster  Defense  Regiment  (UDR,  later 
the  Royal  Irish  Regiment  Home  Service  Force),  and  the  British  Army  whose  role  was  to 
provide  military  assistance  to  the  civil  power  (see  Appendix  K). 

-  The  Trinity.  The  complexity  of  the  Northern  Ireland  problem  can  be  described 
using  the  Clausewitz  Trinity  and  his  concept  of  war  as  an  analytical  framework  and  a 


basis  for  study.  He  used  “war  is  more  than  a  true  chameleon”  as  his  metaphor  that 
explained  unlimited  variations  in  conflict,  shaped  by  contextual  specifics  where  the  cause 
and  course  of  war  cannot  be  planned  or  controlled.  The  character  of  the  Northern  Irish 
conflict  changed  constantly  due  to  the  ever-changing  human  dynamics  of  personalities, 
public  will,  and  public  perception.  The  Troubles  ably  demonstrated  the  three  components 
of  the  Clausewitz  “remarkable  trinity.”^  First,  pulling  and  pushing  the  central  underlying 
forces  of  primordial  violence,  hatred,  and  enmity  were  the  polarizing  nationalisms  of 
Irish  Republicans  and  Ulster  Unionists  (irrational  forces).  Secondly,  the  play  of  chance 
and  probability  were  reflected  by  the  sectarian  and  political  violence  of  paramilitaries  and 
the  actions  of  the  security  forces  (non-rational  forces). Thirdly,  was  the  rational 
purpose  and  policy  of  two  governments  and  the  international  dimension  (rational  forces), 
influenced  by  circumstance  and  time  that  attempted  to  determine  the  locus  of  the  crisis 
between  a  “political  or  operational  center  of  gravity.”'' 

Overview  of  the  framework  for  peace 

The  framework  for  peace  was  the  beginning  of  the  management  of  negotiations 
without  conflict,  through  supporting  effects  of  political,  security,  economic,  and 
social/perceptual  lines  of  development  (Appendix  A).  The  peace  process  has  been  the 


coordination  of  this  framework,  to  ensure  all  the  lines  of  development  and  decisive 
eonditions  have  been  met.  The  Belfast  Agreement  in  1998  brought  the  eonfliet  to  the 
negotiating  table,  and  started  the  peace  proeess.  It  was  faeilitated  through  settled  politieal 
institutions,  whieh  enjoyed  popular  legitimaey  always  previously  denied,  a  “transition  of 
unsustainable  approaches  to  more  sustainable  ones.”  Unionists  and  nationalists  then 
realized  that  they  had  to  make  the  neeessary  eompromises  to  reaeh  an  agreement. 

The  Belfast  Agreement  was  a  sueeess  eompared  to  other  agreements,  as  it 
developed  different  approaehes  to  the  business  of  making  peaee,  new  struetures,  and 
proeesses  of  interaetion.  Firstly,  the  Agreement  had  joint  eustody  from  the  British  and 
Irish  governments  and  included  the  parties  aetively  involved  in  the  eonfliet  (inelusion 
rather  than  exelusion  of  politieal  parties  with  paramilitary  assoeiations  [see  page  7]). 
Seeondly  a  politieal  and  eonstitutional  framework  was  agreed  but  with  a  detailed  and 
eomprehensive  implementation  proeess  to  meet  deeisive  eonditions  aeross  eaeh  line  of 
development.  The  agreement  involved  a  sophistieated  devolution  package,  with 
signifieant  power  resting  with  an  inelusive  power-sharing  assembly  of  Northern  Ireland’s 
elected  representatives.  Northern  Ireland’s  eonstitutional  position  within  the  United 
Kingdom  was  re-affirmed,  the  eonstitution  of  the  Irish  Republie  was  amended  to  remove 
its  territorial  elaim  on  Northern  Ireland,  and  Northern  Ireland’s  future  constitutional 
position  was  linked  to  the  eonsent  of  the  people.  A  British  and  Irish  Council,  and  a 
North-South  Ministerial  Couneil  would  enable  eo-operation  between  the  British  and  Irish 
governments.  The  durability  of  the  Belfast  Agreement  was  its  strong  popular  support 
(71%  support  from  the  electors),  underpinned  by  a  strong  civil  society  in  Northern 
Ireland.  From  the  negotiations  perspeetive,  positional  bargaining  of  the  parties  was 


replaced  by  principled  negotiation  using  an  all-purpose  strategy,  dealing  directly  with  the 
interests  of  the  people  rather  than  party  positions. 

The  framework  for  peace  identified  many  decisive  points  and  conditions  on 
political,  security,  economic,  and  social  lines  of  operation  to  be  met  along  the  way. 
Appendix  A  is  not  intended  to  be  comprehensive,  but  an  overview  of  the  framework  for 
peace  with  the  key  inputs,  influences,  and  the  so  what.  For  example  on  the  security  line 
of  development,  the  most  contention  has  concerned  the  declared  decommissioning  of 
IRA  weapons  in  2005;  this  allowed  the  statements  from  Loyalist  paramilitaries 
committed  to  end  their  terror  campaigns.  Other  decisive  points  that  followed  were  the 
normalization  of  security  and  the  termination  of  the  British  Army  Operation  BANNER  in 
July  2007.^^  What  followed  have  been  the  devolution  of  the  power-sharing  institutions 
by  the  British  government  to  the  local  Stormont  Assembly  in  May  2007,  and  the  final 
hurdle  of  the  devolution  of  Policing  and  Justice  in  April  2010. 

Assessment  of  the  framework  for  peace 

The  stability  and  security  of  any  emerging  peace  process  depends  on  the 
interaction  between  a  range  of  violent  and  non-violent  forces,  challenges  and  influences 
that  are  both  historic  and  current.  Although  there  are  too  many  for  this  paper  to 
summarize  succinctly,  the  following  are  the  immediate  and  most  significant  that  have 
affected  the  stability  and  security  of  the  Northern  Ireland  peace  process.  The  assessment 
starts  with  areas  that  have  generally  worked  well  for  the  framework  for  peace,  followed 
by  areas  that  have  not  worked  so  well,  finishing  with  what  has  failed  to  be  addressed. 

Political  Inclusion,  Messaging  and  Reconciliation  -  A  core  component  of  the 


peace  process  was  inclusion  or  as  Ramsbotham  describes,  “Clausewitz  in  reverse,” 


although  it  was  never  a  straightforward  battle  between  prineiple  (exelusion)  and 
pragmatism  (inelusion).  The  big  unknown  of  integrating  Republieans  and  Loyalists 

into  eonstitutional  polities  eould  either  have  intensified  ethnie  resentment  (a  eontinuation 
of  efforts  to  destabilize)  or  helped  to  eontain  it  (poaehers  beeoming  gamekeepers).  The 
ability  of  aeeomplished  former  paramilitaries  to  hold  polhieal  office  has  proven  that 
inclusion  has  helped  to  contain  mainstream  Republican  and  Loyalist  resentment  within 
the  framework  for  peace.  However  sincere  these  leading  figures  may  be  portrayed,  they 
have  discredited  acts  of  political  violence  they  used  to  command.  Their  influence  and 
open  messaging  to  a  disaffected  youth  has  made  a  difference.  It  has  been  a  compromise 
but  a  necessary  condition  to  secure  the  framework  for  peace.  Reconciliation  has  been  the 
reconfiguration  of  relationships  and  acceptability  between  the  military  (paramilitaries  and 
security  forces)  and  society,  removing  any  sense  of  threat.  Although  many  mainstream 
Republicans  are  better  off  for  this  (e.g.  Martin  McGuinness),  there  is  still  a  risk  of 
Republican  destabilization  and  inflammation  of  the  dissident  cause. 

A  Strong  Civic  Society  Distaste  for  Terrorism  -  The  biggest  single  group 
affected  by  the  Troubles  was  the  local  population,  segregated  by  ethnic  affiliation  and 
determined  political  allegiances.  The  loyalist  strikes  in  1974  portrayed  a  civil  society  that 
was  sectarian,  uncompromising,  and  negative.  Public  perception  and  influence  had 
shifted  almost  full  circle  by  1998  into  a  strategically  focused  and  effective  civil  force  for 
peace.  This  was  an  important  factor.  The  church,  the  media,  and  the  business 
community  strongly  supported  the  Belfast  Agreement,  almost  breaking  ranks  with 
political  orthodoxy.  By  1998,  the  Northern  Irish  society  had  had  enough  of  the  Troubles, 


the  violence  and  hatred  of  the  past.  Their  fatigue  translated  into  power  of  the  popular 
support  for  a  singular  direction. 

The  Political  Principle  of  Consent  -  The  route  to  the  Belfast  Agreement  in  the 
1990’s  saw  the  elevation  of  the  principle  of  consent  into  a  relevant  political  mechanism  to 
decide  Northern  Ireland’s  constitutional  status.  The  decision  by  the  British  and  Irish 
governments  to  put  the  agreement  to  the  people  of  Northern  Ireland  in  a  referendum 
formed  a  cornerstone  to  the  Agreement.  Northern  Ireland’s  constitutional  status  would 
only  change  if  the  people  of  Northern  Ireland  voted  for  it.  The  democratic  validation 
expanded  the  peace  process  to  then  encompass  political  parties,  civil  society,  and  even 
paramilitary  groups.  It  also  provided  moral  authority  that  opponents  found  difficult  to 
counter  into  the  process. 

The  Influence  of  Key  Personalities/Leaders  -  The  peace  process  involved 
concessions  to  end  the  violence  of  paramilitaries  in  return  for  their  entry  into  negotiations 
and  the  broader  deal  for  their  constituents.  In  Northern  Ireland  there  were  key 
personalities  and  leaders  that  influenced  the  process  in  both  a  stable  and  destabilizing 
way,  but  ultimately  their  actions  led  to  final  devolution  of  power  to  Stormont  in  2007. 
There  were  four  larger-than-life  personalities  who  were  the  Troubles’  ‘four  musketeers’: 
David  Trimble  and  Ian  Paisley  from  the  unionist  side,  and  from  the  nationalist  side  Gerry 
Adams  and  John  Hume,  the  leader  of  the  Social  Democratic  and  Labor  Party  (SDLP) 
from  1979  to  2001  and  co-recipient  of  the  1998  Nobel  Peace  Prize,  with  David  Trimble. 
The  musketeers  role  and  responsibility  is  just  as  important  today,  in  whatever  public 
position  or  role  they  hold,  to  influence  either  radicals  or  conservatives,  politicians  and 
leaders,  to  ensure  the  framework  for  peace  they  fought  for  stays  on  track. 


John  Hume  is  analyzed  briefly  as  he  was  the  influential  nationalist  figure  to 
unloek  the  Republiean  strategy  of  politieal  violenee.  He  alone  realized  that  there  was 
more  to  just  the  pereeived  anti-English  mantra  of  “eight  eenturies  of  English  subjugation 
of  Ireland”  and  long  favored  a  peaeemaking  model.  He  embarked  on  a  dialogue  with 
Sinn  Eein/IRA  (the  Hume-Adams  dialogue)  to  rethink  Sinn  Eein’s  entrenehed  views  on 
the  role  of  the  British  Government  and  the  position  of  the  unionist  eommunity  in  Ireland, 
and  find  a  united  and  politieal  way  out  of  the  eonfliet.  He  brought  together  the 
nationalist  eonsensus  by  linking  Sinn  Eein,  the  Soeial  Demoeratie  and  Eabor  Party 
(SDEP),  Irish  Government,  and  Irish  Ameriean  supporters.  He  was  also  instrumental  in 
establishing  the  north/south  institutions  set  out  in  the  ‘Erameworks  for  the  Euture’,  an 
aeknowledgement  of  the  SDEP  elaim  that  there  eould  be  no  exelusively  internal  solution 
to  the  Northern  Ireland  problem.  Prom  a  nationalist  perspeetive,  his  influenee  as  an  old 
hand  eannot  be  understated,  more  so  than  Gerry  Adams  or  Martin  MeGuinness. 

The  International  Dimension  -  A  range  of  international  initiatives  were  tried  and 
tested;  some  met  with  suceess,  and  others  failed  eompletely.  The  British  Government’s 
initial  desire  to  keep  the  Troubles  within  its  domestie  orbit  and  out  of  the  international 
agenda  at  the  start  bloeked  third-party  mediators.  The  mispereeption  was  that  the  British 
Government  thought  it  eould  fulfill  this  role  from  the  start.  Then  the  appointment  of  US 
Senator  George  Mitehell  as  ehairman  of  the  international  body  on  arms  deeommissioning 


beeame  an  integral  eomponent  of  the  British  and  Irish  government’s  twin-traek  proeess. 
Mitehell  then  stayed  on  to  ehair  the  all-party  talks  that  evolved  and  led  up  to  the  Belfast 
Agreement  in  1998.  Also  influential  was  President  Bill  Clinton  visiting  Northern  Ireland 
three  times  in  his  Presideney,  three  visits  more  than  any  other  serving  President.  Por 


Clinton,  Northern  Ireland  would  be  a  low-eost,  low-risk  foreign  policy  endeavor,  pushing 


at  a  door  half-open.  He  encouraged  US  companies  to  invest  and  included  the 


Republicans,  encouraging  them  to  leave  violence  behind. 

The  international  dimension  was  supportive,  strategic,  and  occasional  rather  than 
the  dominant  force  in  setting  the  conditions  for  the  framework  for  peace.  The  use  of 
independent  mediators  and  international  statesman  with  the  trust  and  respect  from  all  the 
opposing  sides,  and  the  public’s  ability  to  identify  with  them,  was  the  success,  rather  than 
using  an  international  body  influenced  by  broader  agendas.  This  is  why  the  US  influence 
was  so  critical  compared  to  others.  The  instability  of  the  framework  for  peace  since 
1998  has  not  yet  reached  the  level  of  influence  or  interest  for  international  mediation. 

Secret  Talks  and  Ceasefires  -  Secret  talks  between  representatives  of  the  main 
warring  factions,  in  this  particular  case  the  IRA  and  the  British  Government,  can  often 
facilitate  the  start  of  open  political  dialogue.  For  Northern  Ireland,  it  involved  taking 
political  risks,  overcoming  rival  intelligence  battles,  and  influencing  protagonists  to 
provide  a  conduit  to  start  negotiations.  The  Northern  Ireland  conflict  proved  the  value 
of  secret  talks  and  ceasefires.  Before  the  1994  ceasefires,  the  talks  brought  agreement  in 
principle  on  a  number  of  sensitive  issues  of  compromise,  such  as  the  early  release  of 
prisoners  and  the  public  inclusion  of  Sinn  Fein  to  negotiations,  which  had  not  been  done 

Terrorist  Disengagement  and  De-Radicalization  to  enable  Negotiations  -  The 

Northern  Ireland  peace  process  required  an  ingenious  approach  to  the  tricky  problem  of 
how  to  disengage  and  de-radicalize  a  terrorist  movement  while  also  negotiating  with  ex¬ 
militants.  The  Mitchell  Principles  (see  Appendix  G)  set  conditions  for  entry  to  talks. 


enforced  them,  and  succeeded  in  imposing  unwelcome  norms  during  the  critical 
negotiations  period,  that  Sinn  Fein  in  particular  were  unused  to.  In  late  February  1998 
after  the  use  of  Republican  vigilante  violence  by  the  IRA,  Sinn  Fein  was  expelled,  and 
not  allowed  to  take  part  in  the  negotiations  for  two  weeks.  It  was  at  considerable  cost  in 
terms  of  party  distraction  and  lost  negotiating  time.^"^ 

Military  Lessons  -  Initially  the  Army  had  not  set  out  a  clear  campaign  plan  or 
strategy.  The  British  contemporary  doctrine  at  the  time  Counter  Revolutionary  Warfare 
was  based  upon  the  jungle,  rural  operations,  and  colonial  territories.  As  a  result  the 
troops  expected  some  kind  of  internal  security  situation  of  Cyprus,  Aden,  or  British 
Guiana.  The  military  had  to  learn  and  adapt  to  a  campaign  that  contained  elements  of  a 
classical  and  modern  insurgency,  coupled  with  the  integration  of  the  population  and  high 
profile  information  operations.  The  key  lessons  learnt  were  a  need  for  an  over  arching 
campaign  authority,  understanding  the  root  causes  of  the  violence,  and  realistic 
expectations  about  the  length  of  time  needed  to  resolve  the  situation  (the  long  war). 

Other  lessons  included  the  value  of  a  dedicated  operational  training  team  system;  a  policy 
of  preventing  violence  in  the  first  instance;  developing  first  rate  intelligence  structures, 
processes,  and  capabilities;  and  finally  to  fully  appreciate  how  covert  offensive  action  by 
special  operations  or  intelligence  organizations  would  play  out  in  the  political  arena  and 

-5  0 

other  spheres.  These  lessons  have  been  valuable  to  ensure  a  secure  framework  for  the 
future;  unfortunately  demilitarization  and  organizational  change  of  security  structures  has 
led  to  a  requirement  for  these  lessons  to  be  relearnt. 


The  key  areas  that  have  lead  to  the  instability  and  inseeurity  for  the  framework  for 
peace  are  political,  security,  social,  and  the  most  recent  area,  economics. 

Strategic  Understanding  -  The  British  Government  and  Army  failed  to 
understand,  let  alone  influence,  Irish  policy  and  planning  leading  up  to  1969  and  served 


at  times  to  reinforce  the  polarizing  effect  that  has  made  the  Troubles  so  enduring. 
Understanding  and  knowledge  of  the  problem  improved  but  as  John  Belloch,  the 
Permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State  in  1988,  stated:  “neither  a  London  nor  a  Belfast  (let 
alone  a  Dublin)  picture  was  complete  in  itself  Ministers,  officials,  others  of  our 
governing  community  were  all  at  risk  of  losing  the  essential  binocular  vision  of  the 
Northern  Ireland  situation,  without  constant  and  conscious  self-awareness  of  it.”"^°  This 
lack  of  strategic  understanding  of  the  character  of  the  Troubles  is  unfortunately  still  seen 
today  within  the  British  and  Irish  governments,  leading  to  a  lack  of  strategic  insight 
towards  planning  for  a  secure  and  stable  framework  for  peace  in  the  future.  Political 
leadership  from  within  Northern  Ireland  is  also  part  of  the  problem.  The  First  Minister 
Peter  Robinson  said  in  his  Christmas  2011  message  that  “he  is  determined  to  do  all  he 
can  to  build  upon  peace  and  stability  in  Northern  Ireland  in  2012.”  We  still  await  his 
leadership  and  strategic  direction  as  to  how  he  will  achieve  this,  for  it  is  lacking. 

The  division  of  the  unionist  movement  -  the  Unionist  movement  has  been 
obliged  to  move  towards  a  new  pluralist  politics,  embracing  new  economic  and  political 
relationships  with  an  Irish  Republic. This  has  weakened  the  link  between  Unionist 
politics  and  its  cultural  and  religious  heritage  of  Protestant-Britishness.  There  remains 

disunity  over  the  best  means  of  retaining  their  constitutional  link  to  Great  Britain. 


Security  -  Dissident  Republicans  -  Contrary  to  British  Security  Service 
assessment  in  2007  that  the  residual  threat  from  terrorism  in  Northern  Ireland  was  likely 
to  decline,  there  has  been  a  persistent  and  significant  rise  in  terrorist  activity  and  ambition 
in  Northern  Ireland  over  the  last  three  years;  the  terrorist  threat  level  in  Northern  Ireland 
is  graded  SEVERE"^^  (see  Appendix  H).  Dissident  Republican  groups,  significantly  the 
Real  Irish  Republican  Army  (RIRA)  and  the  Continuity  Irish  Republican  Army  (CIRA) 
have  not  supported  the  peace  process  and  remain  active.  Recently  other  dissident  groups 
have  joined  the  mix  including  Republican  Action  Against  Drugs,  Eirigi,  Republican 
Network  for  Unity,  and  most  notably  the  growing  threat  of  Oghlaigh  Na  h’Eireann 
(OnH).  Dissidents  purport  to  reject  any  political  agreement  that  falls  short  of  a  British 
withdrawal  from  Northern  Ireland  and  the  establishment  of  an  independent  and  united 
Ireland,  reflecting  the  capacity  of  a  tradition  to  endure.  Their  ideological  Totalitarian 
Republicanism  holds  sympathy  with  the  nationalist  population.  Despite  their  number  of 
approximately  six  hundred,  with  RIRA  posing  as  the  largest  membership,  they  do  have  a 
mobilization  potential  within  the  nationalist  community.  The  threat  to  GB  remains.  In 
May  201 1,  a  number  of  coded  warnings  were  received  which  suggested  a  bomb  had  been 
left  in  Central  Eondon.  Although  it  was  a  hoax,  these  were  the  first  coded  warnings 
related  to  GB  from  Northern  Ireland  terrorist  groups  for  ten  years. 

Britain’s  National  Security  Strategy  2010  (NSS)  identified  as  a  priority  risk/  Tier 
One  “international  terrorism  affecting  the  UK  or  its  interests;  and/or  a  significant  increase 
in  the  levels  of  terrorism  relating  to  Northern  Ireland;”  the  strategy  further  states  that  “the 
security  situation  is  unlikely  to  improve  in  the  short  term.”"^"^  The  threat  of  Irish  terrorism 
and  the  risk  to  the  peace  process  was  also  recognized  as  a  Tier  One  risk  in  the  National 


Security  Risk  Asses sment.'^^  The  Strategic  Defense  and  Security  Review  2010  (SDSR) 
stated  “the  ongoing  recruitment  of  experienced  terrorists  and  a  younger  generation  will 
contribute  to  a  continued  high  level  of  threat  in  Northern  Ireland,  as  well  as  in  Great 
Britain  where  the  threat  level  was  recently  raised  from  Moderate  to  Substantial,  meaning 
that  an  attack  is  a  strong  possibility.”"^^  Although  UK  arrest  and  prosecution  data 
provides  only  a  partial  picture  of  the  terrorist  threat,  the  number  of  arrests  in  connection 
with  terrorist  related  activity  in  Northern  Ireland  in  2010  was  98%  higher  than  in  2009 
(see  Appendix  As  a  result  of  NI  terrorism  threat  and  risk  analysis,  in  February 
201 1,  an  additional  £245  million  was  provided  to  help  cope  with  the  dissident  threat: 


£199.5  million  from  the  Treasury  and  £45  million  from  the  NI  Executive. 

The  dissident  Republicans  (DRs)  are  determined  to  try  to  destabilize  the  Northern 
Ireland  Executive  (NIE)  and  continue  to  target  the  Police  Service  of  Northern  Ireland 
(PSNI)  in  particular;  they  also  aspire  to  mount  attacks  in  Great  Britain. Once 
coordinated  and  cooperative,  they  have  proved  to  be  dangerous  and  resilient.  Recently 
there  have  been  different  attack  techniques,  improved  weapons  capability,  all  have  been 
Northern  Ireland  focused  (especially  under-vehicle  IEDs).^°  There  is  little  evidence  of 
any  political  initiative  on  the  part  of  the  dissident  Republican  splinter  groups,  and  even  if 
they  were  in  a  position  to  articulate  their  strategy  publicly,  it  is  unlikely  that  the  message 
would  be  coherent.  Their  political  base  is  small  and  localized,  as  evidenced  in  the 
2010  Economic  and  Social  Research  Council  Election  Survey.  The  dissident  makeup 
and  support  network  bring  a  completely  different  security  dilemma  for  the  British  and 
Irish  security  forces.  The  concern  is  that  these  are  the  ‘clean  skins’  or  unknowns, 
recruited  from  a  new  generation  of  Republican  extremists.  They  are  uniting  a  network 


of  radicals  dissatisfied  with  the  route  of  mainstream  Republicanism,  and  utilizing  the 
power  vaeuum  in  disaffeeted  eommunities  left  by  the  poliee  and  PIRA.^"^  They  view 
publie  support  as  useful  but  not  essential,  a  key  distinction  between  eriminal  and  politieal 
insurgents.  They  laek  the  politieal  ideology  and  operational  eapaeity  of  the  Provisional 
IRA;  instead  it  is  limited  to  the  romanticized  violent  Republican  tradition.  The  use  of 
their  eriminal  enterprises  in  the  day,  with  involvement  in  both  smuggling  and  the  illegal 
nareoties  market,  and  their  terrorist  aetivity  in  the  evening,  has  brought  a  rise  in 
Republiean  violenee  mixed  with  eriminality.  This  is  a  potent  eombination  of  politieal 
signifieance,  but  it  is  also  an  opportunity  for  a  eounter  terrorist  strategy  to  target 
dissidents  for  more  eommon  forms  of  eriminality.^^  This  disruption  of  the  networks  for 
vulnerabilities  in  lifestyles  could  bring  local  support  back  to  the  community  policing,  an 
area  onee  the  domain  of  the  Provisional  IRA.  As  illustrated  in  Appendix  H,  there  are 
worrying  trends,  but  to  maintain  some  perspeetive  from  the  Troubles,  even  in  the  last  two 
years,  the  total  number  of  ineidents  attributed  to  dissident  Republieans  in  any  one  year  is 
less  than  that  reeorded  in  two  days  at  the  height  of  the  Troubles  in  the  early  1970s.  The 
dissidents  are  not  at  the  seale  of  the  Provisional  IRA  at  their  zenith,  but  a  destabilizing 
influenee  on  the  framework  for  peaee  for  the  future  nonetheless. 

Reforming  the  Police  Service  -  the  politieal  reform  required  of  the  Royal  Ulster 
Constabulary  (RUC)  to  meet  the  milestones  set  out  in  the  Independent  Commission  on 
Polieing  for  Northern  Ireland  in  1998  (Patten  Commission),  has  left  its  conventional 
polieing  within  the  PSNI  unprepared  to  eope  with  the  demands  of  eounter-terrorism  and 
serious  and  organized  erime.  The  rush  to  readdress  the  demographie  imbalanees  of  a 
majority  Protestant  poliee  foree  to  reeruiting  more  Catholie  volunteers  has  ereated  a 


significant  gap  in  counter-terrorist  experienee.^^  This  is  most  telling  at  the  loeal  polieing 
level.  These  ehanges,  eoupled  with  the  demilitarization  from  the  Army  have  led  to  a  far 
weaker  seeurity  apparatus  to  stop  a  growing  national  seeurity  threat  and  priority  for 
polieing.  Although  the  PSNI  had  an  extremely  eapable  eounter-terrorist  organization,  it 
is  now  ageing  and  it  needs  to  reeruit  seeurity  eonseious  operators,  whieh  it  is  no  longer 
finding.  Eleven  years  on,  the  PSNI  has  now  elaimed  it  has  had  to  rehire  former  offieers 
on  temporary  eontraets  beeause  “they  have  the  skills  and  eritieal  experienee  it  needs  to 
investigate  erimes  and  eombat  terrorism.”  Nearly  half  of  them  are  employed  in  the 

most  sensitive  areas  of  polieing,  ineluding  intelligenee.^^  This  is  indieative  of  the  soeial 
and  personnel  ehallenges  the  PSNI  faee  for  the  future  rather  than  a  struetural  problem  to 
the  framework  for  peaee  itself. 

Demilitarization  (Normalization)/  Decommissioning  -  This  proved  to  be  one  of 

the  main  stumbling  bloeks  for  the  framework  for  peaee  after  1998.  The  paee  of 
demilitarization  of  the  seeurity  forees,  to  inelude  foree  struetures,  eapabilities,  estate, 
fiseal,  and  the  transfer  of  tasks  to  the  PSNI  and  Seeurity  Serviees  under  the  Op  BANNER 
normalization  direetives,  did  not  mateh  the  pereeived  paee  of  deeommissioning  of  the 
paramilitary  eapability.  The  Belfast  Agreement  laeked  a  graduated  program  of 
deeommissioning  synehronized  with  any  seeurity  foree  or  state  demilitarization.  A 
synehronized  program  eould  have  prevented  the  time  eonsuming  dispute  over  IRA 
deeommissioning  that  eventually  ineluded  an  announeement  by  the  IRA,  on  the  26* 
September  2005:  “the  IRA  leadership  ean  now  eonfirm  that  the  proeess  of  putting  our 
arms  verifiably  beyond  use  has  been  eompleted.”*’*’  Despite  promises,  trust,  and 
eonfidenee  there  are  still  unanswered  questions  for  the  publie  sueh  as,  “what  pereentage 


of  arms  have  actually  been  destroyed”  and  “how  do  we  know  remnants  are  beyond  use?” 
There  remains  too  much  ambiguity  on  whether  this  decisive  condition  has  been  achieved 
or  merely  appeased  for  political  and  perception  reasons. 

Dealing  with  the  past  -  Enquiries  have  been  an  adjunct  to  the  peace  process, 
including  the  Office  of  the  Police  Ombudsman  and  Historical  Enquiries  Team  (HET) 
reviewing  historic  crimes  and  incidents  where  evidence  is  unclear  or  conflicting. 

Eegally,  morally,  and  politically  of  help  on  the  road  to  peace,  they  have  been  part  of  a 
process  of  appeasement  to  the  communities  that  something  is  being  done  to  heal  the  rift 
of  alleged  collusion,  corruption,  and  public  accountability.  In  June  2010,  David  Cameron 
announced  in  the  House  of  Commons  the  results  of  the  Eord  Saville  Bloody  Sunday 
Inquiry  as  “unjustified  and  unjustifiable.”  This  was  matched  by  jubilation  by  the 
nationalist  community  in  Londonderry.^'  At  a  cost  of  £195  million,  the  British 


Government  stated,  “there  will  never  be  such  an  open-ended  and  costly  inquiry  again.” 

Economics  -  the  economic  development  and  financial  self-sufficiency  of 
Northern  Ireland  was  not  comprehensively  addressed  as  part  of  the  Belfast  Agreement. 
Today,  the  economic  crisis  and  downturn  has  exposed  the  vulnerability  of  Northern 
Ireland.  It  has  the  lowest  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and 
the  rate  of  unemployment  has  increased  in  four  years  from  3.8%  in  2007  to  19.1%  in 
2011.^"'  The  Index  of  Production  (lOP)  for  Northern  Ireland  from  the  Department  of 
Einance  and  Personnel  has  shown  a  steady  decline  in  Northern  Ireland’s  production 
sector  industries  in  real  terms.  The  Northern  Ireland  index  remains  some  18.9%  below 
the  peak  recorded  in  the  boom  of  Quarter  4,  2007.  In  the  same  period  the  UK  fell  by 
10.6%  over  the  same  period. PricewaterhouseCoopers  projects  2012  growth  of  1.0% 


for  the  UK  economy  and  just  0.6%  for  Northern  Ireland.^^  As  the  Chief  of  Defense  Staff 
announced,  “the  single  biggest  strategic  risk  facing  the  UK  today  is  economic  rather  than 
military. ...  a  thriving  economy  must  be  central  to  any  Grand  Strategy.”  The  extent  and 

quality  of  Northern  Ireland’s  economic  revival  has  depended  on  five  main  factors:  direct 


grants,  increased  investment,  the  tourism  and  retail  sectors,  the  fair  employment  issue, 
and  the  security  factor.  The  factor  carrying  the  most  risk  today  is  that  of  direct  grants 
coupled  with  the  destabilization  of  the  economic  downturn. 

In  1977  Northern  Ireland  was  designated  as  a  priority  objective  European  Union 
(EU)  region  on  the  basis  of  its  peripheral  position  and  disadvantaged  status.  The  EU  has 
been  the  largest  supporter  of  peace  building  through  Peace  Eunds.  The  current  grant, 
the  last  of  three,  runs  out  in  2013.  At  the  time  of  the  last  European  elections,  in  2009,  it 
was  generally  assumed  that  PEACE  III,  worth  333  million  euros,  would  be  the  last 
special  hand  out  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Irish  border  counties  would  get  from 
Brussels. There  is  not  yet  any  new  British  Government  support  to  the  EU  for  Peace 
Eund  IV.  The  risk  is  that  this  could  become  embroiled  in  the  wider  EU  budget 
negotiations  dragging  up  to  2013,  when  Peace  III  runs  out,  coupled  with  wider  British 


Government  financial  austerity  measures. 

The  UK  Exchequer  has  been  the  largest  contributor  with  an  annual  subvention, 
new  government  grants,  and  tax  relief  and  peace  bonuses.  As  a  result  of  the  economic 
downturn  Northern  Ireland  is  no  longer  insulated  by  public  spending  largesse,  budget 
cuts  driven  by  the  British  Government’s  coalition  spending  review  have  reduced  funding 
from  central  government  to  Northern  Ireland  by  6.9%  over  the  next  four  years.  In  2010, 


Northern  Ireland  enjoyed  publie  spending  per  head  25%  above  the  UK  average,  with  a 
third  of  the  employed  workforee  in  the  publie  seetor. 

The  final  eeonomie  twist  eomes  from  the  southern  Irish  National  Asset 
Management  Ageney  (Nama),  whieh  bought  out  the  toxie  debt  left  in  Irish  banks  after  the 
property  crash  at  the  end  of  2007.^"^  Nama  now  controls  over  £3.35  billion  worth  of  debt 
in  properties  and  businesses  in  Northern  Ireland  and  is  now  ready  to  raise  funds  for  the 
southern  Irish  taxpayer  who  ended  up  funding  the  project,  by  selling  its  assets  in  the 
north.  So  after  all  of  the  Troubles,  the  southern  Irish  taxpayer  is  effectively  setting  the 
level  of  the  Northern  Ireland  property  market. 

The  assumption  is  that  all  of  this  is  manageable.  Northern  Ireland  is  a  small 
region  within  a  rich  nation-state,  but  the  strength  of  the  economic  union  has  now  become 
a  source  of  instability  (see  recommendations).^^  The  threat  is  that  the  Northern  Irish 
business  community  has  not  seen  a  consistent  “reduction  of  uncertainty,  as  it  depends  on 
the  prospect  of  stability.”  The  extent  and  quality  of  Northern  Ireland’s  economic  revival 
is  still  very  much  dependent  on  its  five  main  factors.  The  Northern  Ireland  Executive 
economic  strategy,  and  the  latest  economic  commentary  by  the  department  on  30* 
January  2012,  fails  to  convince  the  public  that  there  is  a  path  for  sustainable  growth  and 
prosperity  for  2012  and  beyond.  Instead  the  strategy  focuses  on  a  path  of  “Rebalancing 
and  Rebuilding  to  improve  the  economic  competitiveness  of  the  Northern  Ireland 
economy. The  strategy  lacks  any  detail,  progress  and  is  not  an  economic  path  at  all.^° 

Recommendations  for  the  future 

Political  party  and  ethnic  bloc  rivalries  still  dominate  the  political  agenda,  at  the 
expense  of  a  sense  of  collective  responsibility  to  the  interests  of  the  Northern  Irish 


people.  The  parallel  trajeetories  of  the  DUP  and  Sinn  Fein  have  left  them  defined  less  by 
their  eonstitutional  preferenees,  and  more  by  their  politieal  messaging  and  soeio-ethnie 
influence,  publicly  opposing  new  violence.  The  provisions  of  the  Belfast  Agreement 
must  be  overtaken  by  a  more  open  and  accommodating  political  structure.  This  structure 
requires  institutions  of  government  to  effectively  deliver  the  range  of  public  policy 
outcomes  desired  by  the  great  majority  of  the  people,  irrespective  of  background  or 
affinitive  ideology.  The  coalition  of  nationalists  and  unionists  to  rule  together  (as  First 
and  Deputy  First  Minister)  still  negates  any  effective  political  opposition  or  oversight. 
Northern  Ireland  politic  needs  stronger  governance  and  leadership  to  promote  a 
comprehensive  response  to  the  critical  challenges  ahead. 

For  security  the  PSNI  needs  to  be  more  rigorously  trained  in  counter-terrorism  to 
compensate  for  the  lack  of  practical  experience  at  the  local  level.  The  Security  Policy 
Meetings  (SPM)  must  continue  to  place  counter-terrorism  work  as  a  high  priority  as 
part  of  policing.  Key  counter-terrorist  capabilities  should  be  maintained,  along  with 
enhancement  of  counter-terrorist  capabilities  in  areas  with  significant  intelligence 
collection  gaps.  A  counter-dissident  Republican  strategy  ought  to  take  into  account  the 
constantly  changing  social  and  political  circumstances  within  its  community  and  criminal 
policing,  specifically  within  Republicanism.  Success  should  not  be  measured  in  terms  of 
arrests,  but  prosecutions  in  the  courts  (only  21%  for  Northern  Ireland).  The  Public 
Prosecution  Service  of  Northern  Ireland  should  reassess  its  criminal  conviction  and 
procedure  in  line  with  the  recommendations  set  out  in  the  Justice  and  Security  Green 
Paper  (October  2011).  This  recommendation  is  worthy  of  further  study  as  any 
terrorism  case  can  fall  at  the  charge,  decision  to  prosecute,  or  committal  and  trial,  due  to 


a  lack  of  robust  protection  for  safeguarding  the  disclosure  of  relevant  sensitive  material 
and  eolleetion  teehniques. 

The  Northern  Ireland  Exeeutive  requires  an  improved  eeonomie  strategy  that 
promotes  private  investment,  growth,  and  a  higher  proportion  of  self-funding.  There 
ought  to  be  less  self-relianee  on  publie  expenditure  and  grants  and  greater  symbiosis  of 
eeonomie  and  soeial  development.  Seeuring  a  lower  eorporation  tax  should  be  a  top 
priority  to  make  the  most  of  the  Exeeutive ’s  planned  eapital  expenditure  plan.  This  will 
boost  eonfidenee  in  the  business  area.  Einally  Northern  Ireland  should  diversify  its 
export  base  to  avoid  over-relianee  on  a  small  number  of  markets  and  to  take  advantage  of 
opportunities  in  the  faster  growing  emerging  eeonomies. 

There  has  been  little  soeial  reintegration  and  reeoneiliation  for  members  of 
paramilitary  organizations  transitioning  to  normal  soeiety  in  Northern  Ireland,  espeeially 
aeross  the  seetarian  divide.  Sueeessful  proseeution  does  not  eliminate  risk,  as  terrorists 
ean  eontinue  to  pose  a  threat  after  their  release.  A  laek  of  soeial  projeets  and  edueation 
has  simply  let  a  number  of  ex-eombatants  relapse  and  join  dissident  groups,  adding 
experieneed  operatives.  Improved  edueation  and  soeietal  reintegration  of  former 
paramilitaries  is  required  before  the  next  generation  is  reeruited  by  the  very  same 
disenfranehised  ex-eombatant  paramilitaries.  The  final  soeial  issue  is  the  mutually 
exelusive  British-Irish  nationalisms  and  identities  based  upon  Northern-Irishness  that 


remains  un-reeoneiled.  The  population  needs  an  aeeeptable  narrative  and  strueture. 

The  Belfast  Agreement  only  served  to  reduee  this  eompetitiveness. 

There  is  no  standard  model  aeross  the  different  government  departments  and 
jurisdietions  to  analyze  the  framework  for  peaee.  Data  is  eolleeted  in  different  ways. 


estimates,  survey  data,  and  there  is  no  means  to  provide  an  analytieal  perspeetive  on  a 
eonsistent  basis.  The  Peace  Monitoring  Report,  February  2012,  is  the  first  attempt, 
fourteen  years  after  the  Belfast  Agreement  but  it  laeks  eomprehensive  reeommendations. 


Fourteen  years  after  the  Belfast  Agreement  and  subsequent  framework,  the  eore 
soeio-ethnie  dispute  is  unresolved;  Northern  Ireland  remains  a  divided  soeiety.  Two 
exelusive  sets  of  nationalists  are  still  loeked  in  eompetition,  destined  by  history  to  live 
side  by  side  on  the  same  land.  The  aims  of  many  nationalists  who  took  up  arms 
originally  to  bring  about  a  united  Ireland  have  not  been  realized,  any  more  than  the  aims 

th  th  88 

of  earlier  generations  in  the  late  19  and  early  20  eenturies  were  fully  aehieved. 
Jonathon  Evans,  Direetor-General  of  the  Seeurity  Serviee,  stated  “the  pattern  of  history 
over  the  last  hundred  years  shows  that  whenever  the  main  body  of  Irish  Republieanism 
has  reaehed  a  politieal  aoeommodation  and  rejoined  eonstitutional  polities,  a  hardliner 


rejeetionist  group  would  fragment  off  and  eontinue  with  the  so  ealled  armed  struggle.” 
Northern  Ireland  polities  needs  to  eontinue  its  reform,  balanee,  and  strueture  to  enable  a 
seeure  and  stable  framework  for  peaee. 

Uniting  Ireland  may  no  longer  be  a  publie  priority,  but  Republiean  extremists  may 
wish  to  return  it  to  the  publie  arena  as  part  of  their  strategy.  Instead  their  use  of  violenee 
eontinues  through  dissidents  who  view  the  Provisional  IRA  as  engaging  “in  a  eolleetive 
aet  of  gross  betrayal,”  mirroring  the  history  of  the  Irish  Republiean  Army  (see  Appendix 
D).  This  threat  has  been  most  reeently  outlined  in  the  British  National  Security  Strategy, 
the  Strategic  Defense  Security  Review  doeuments,  and  stated  by  Jonathon  Evans,  the 


Director-General  of  the  Security  Service.  From  a  security  perspective,  the  framework  for 
peace  is  not  stable  and  secure. 

Economics,  as  a  line  of  development,  did  not  prove  a  major  hurdle  in  the  way  of  a 
peace  agreement,  but  it  will  arguably  be  a  destabilizing  force  in  the  framework  for  the 
future.  The  five  main  factors  of  economic  revival  in  1998  are  still  prevalent  in  the 
framework  for  peace  today.  However,  the  business  community  lack  confidence  in  the 
current  economic  downturn,  there  is  a  huge  risk  in  the  unemployment  trap,  and  Northern 
Ireland  is  more  reliant  on  external  economic  influences  for  its  own  revival.  From  an 
economic  perspective,  the  framework  for  peace  is  not  stable  and  secure. 

The  Northern  Ireland  problem  was  a  trinity  that  harbored  entrenched  socio-ethnic 
communal  divisions,  was  home  to  a  protracted  low-intensity  conflict,  and  was 
characterized  by  the  repeated  failure  of  local  politicians  to  reach  agreement  on  sharing 
power.  The  contributions  from  all  sides,  British  and  Irish,  helped  accommodate  a 
compromise  of  peace  for  a  strong  civic  society  long  divided  within  itself.  The  Troubles 
have  left  behind  a  terrible  legacy  fashioned  by  long  years  of  emotion,  suffering,  fatigue 
and  hate,  of  dead  and  wounded,  with  trauma  that  will  take  generations  to  heal.  The  social 
line  of  development  within  the  framework  for  peace  is  still  far  from  stable  and  secure. 

Northern  Ireland  is  unlikely  to  ever  know  perfect  peace.  In  order  to  overcome  the 
disruptive  forces  that  threaten  the  framework  and  provide  a  stable  and  secure  future,  the 
Northern  Ireland  Assembly  must  overcome  the  weakness  in  governance  inherent  in  the 
Belfast  Agreement  and  address  the  critical  security  and  economic  challenges.  A  reformed 
Northern  Ireland  still  seeks  a  secure  and  stable  future. 


Appendix  A 


Origins  and  Causes  ? 




Issues  for? 

persona  litiesiandl?! 























•  British!?!\ 

•  Irishlffii 
Internationa  14 


•  Protesta  nt/!S 


»  Catholic/0 

•  Other!?) 


'  Republican! 

•  Loyalists!?/ 

•  Securit 



1.  - 








A  A  1 

1.  V  \. 

— y  V - 

— - Za — , 



DemilitarizationB  DevolutionlBfl?] 








- A - 


















PPSI^NI  )IJirocedu  rePI 










Eariyi3^eleasei$cheme[ffl  ReconciliationHI 



19981 3 


-  Political[lnclusionllndl3teconciliation.l3 
-  PoliticahIDividedllUnionism.lB 
-  SecuritylShreatl2)fiDissidentl3tepublicana?iolence,llriminalityllndllerroristiactivityl2 
-  SecurityUhangesaoli’olicingllndllCounter-Terrorism.S 
-  SecuritylDemilitarizationl|NormaIization)[lndlDecommissioning.l3 

-  HistoricallInquiriesE 


Appendix  B 

Defining  the  language 

Words,  definitions  and  nuances  in  language  in  the  context  of  Irish  history  and 
politics  are  important.  Geographically,  Ulster  was  an  historic  province  of  Ireland  and 
comprised  the  nine  counties.  Six  counties  of  those  nine  now  form  Northern  Ireland.  The 
British  Government  only  included  six  counties  in  Northern  Ireland  to  guarantee  a 
Protestant  majority,  leaving  Donegal,  Monaghan,  and  Cavan  in  southern  Ireland.  This  is 
why  Northern  Ireland  as  Ulster  is  not  correct.  This  paper  uses  Northern  Ireland  rather 
than  Ulster,  or  alternatively  the  Province.^'  The  government  of  Northern  Ireland  is 
usually  referred  to  as  Stormont  after  Stormont  Castle,  where  it  sat  and  sits  again. 

It  is  also  important  to  draw  the  distinction  between  nationalists  and  Republicans. 
Nationalists  refer  to  the  entity  of  the  community  seeking  support  for  a  united  Ireland, 
which  is  almost  universally  Catholic.  Republicans  demand  completed  independence 
under  a  Republican  government,  and  are  associated  with  a  willingness  to  use  physical 
force  or  armed  struggle  to  achieve  political  goals. 

From  the  opposing  side,  the  ideology  of  Unionism  in  Northern  Ireland  favors  the 
continuation  of  some  form  of  political  union  between  Ireland  and  Great  Britain  and 
almost  universally  Protestant.  Unionists  are  community  focused  on  preserving  the  place 
of  Northern  Ireland  within  the  United  Kingdom.  Finally  a  Loyalist  is  a  militant  unionist 
in  opposition  to  Irish  Republicanism. 


Appendix  C 

Geography  of  Northern  Ireland^^ 

Northern  Ireland  is  an  integral  part  of  the  United  Kingdom.  It  is  situated  in  the 
northeastern  portion  of  the  island  of  Ireland.  It  consists  of  six  of  the  nine  counties  that 
were  part  of  the  former  province  of  Ulster:  Antrim,  Armagh,  Down,  Fermanagh, 
Londonderry,  and  Tyrone. 

Belfast  is  the  Capital  City  and  the  Seat  of  Government.  It  comprises  about  one-sixth 
of  the  entire  island  with  5,463  square  miles  (14,  148  square  kilometers),  where  the  entire 
island  consists  of  32,595  square  miles  (84,431  square  kilometers).  The  measurements  of 
the  island  are  174  miles  (280  kilometers)  width,  and  302  miles  (486  kilometers)  length. 
Northern  Ireland  measures  about  85  miles  (135  kilometers)  north  and  south.  It  is  about 
110  miles  (175  kilometers)  east  and  west.  There  is  a  spot  in  Northern  Ireland  that  is  only 
thirteen  and  one -half  miles  from  Scotland,  although  most  sea  crossings  were  fifty  miles  in 
the  southern  part  of  the  island  and  70  miles  in  the  northern  part.  The  centerpiece  of 
Northern  Ireland's  geography  is  Lough  Neagh,  at  151  square  miles  (391  km^)  the  largest 
freshwater  lake  both  on  the  island  of  Ireland  and  in  the  British  Isles. 


Appendix  D 

Timeline  of  the  Troubles 




1920  - 1969 


Government  of  Ireland  Act  passed 

Partition  of  Ireland  into  North  and  South.  Ancient 
Ulster  was  nine  counties,  but  the  British  Government 
only  included  six  counties  in  Northern  Ireland  to 
guarantee  a  Protestant  majority  -  leaving  Donegal, 
Monaghan,  and  Cavan  in  southern  Ireland. 


Formation  of  the  Ulster  Special 
Constabulary  (USC)  or  ‘B’  Specials 

It  was  a  reserve  force  called  out  in  times  of 
emergency,  such  as  wars  or  insurgency. 


Formation  of  the  Royal  Ulster 
Constabulary  (RUC) 

1956  -  1962 

Operation  HARVEST 

The  IRA  border  campaign.  The  border  campaign 
failed  as  it  had  minimal  support  from  the  Catholic 
minority.  It  invited  repressive  cross-border  measures 
such  as  internment,  and  was  countered  by  the  political 
will  of  the  Northern  Irish  Brookeborough 
administration  that  consistently  urged  restraint. 

The  IRA  then  sought  to  end  partition  by  physical 
force,  its  statement  that  followed  announced: 

“Out  of  this  national  liberation  struggle  a  new  Ireland 
will  emerge,  upright  and  free.  In  that  New  Ireland  we 
shall  build  a  country  for  all  our  people  to  live.  That 
then  is  our  aim:  an  independent,  united,  democratic 
Irish  Republic.  For  this  we  shall  light  until  the 
invader  is  driven  from  our  soil  and  victory  is  ours.” 


UVF  formed 

‘Gusty’  Spence  appointed  as  the  first  UVF 


50'*'  anniversary  of  the  Easter  Uprising 

UVF  murders  several  people  across  Belfast 


Northern  Ireland  Civil  Rights  (NICRA) 

The  nationalists  sought  an  appropriate  means  of 
rectifying  their  inequitable  treatment  in  a  province  in 
which  they  exerted  scant  influence.  The  political 
stagnation  was  replaced  by  NICRA  challenge  and 
confrontation.  Although  NICRA  was  essentially  a 
moderate  organization,  it  was  prepared  to  extend 
earlier  pressure  group  activity  into  civil  disobedience. 


4  January  1969 

People’s  Democracy  march  from  Belfast  to 
Londonderry  attacked  by  Loyalists  and 
Ulster  Constabulary  members  (‘B’  Specials) 

10  August  1969 

Rioting  in  Belfast  and  Londonderry 

The  ‘Battle  of  the  Bogside’  in  Londonderry 

14  August  1969 

British  troops  deploy  onto  Northern  Ireland 

Underlying  tensions  had  manifested  themselves  into 
sectarian  conflict.  The  British  troops  were  to 
stabilize  British  rule  of  Ulster  and  restore  order. 

October  1969 

Publication  of  the  Hunt  Report 

It  resulted  in  reshaping  the  RUC,  the 
disbandment  of  the  Ulster  Special 
Constabulary  and  the  formation  of  the 
Ulster  Defense  Regiment. 

The  Hunt  Report  advised  a  re-shaping  of  the 
Northern  Ireland’s  Security  Forces  into  a  less 
partisan  force,  accountable  to  the  public  for  its 
actions,  and  a  police  force  civilian  in  nature. 



1 1  January  1970 

IRA  splits  into  Official  and  Provisional 

The  IRA  final  break,  over  an  issue  of  historieal 
prineipal.  The  Marxist  faetion  of  the  Republiean 
movement  wished  to  reeognize  the  legitimaey  of  the 
Dublin  government,  the  traditionalists  regarded  this 
as  heresy,  the  IRA  split,  and  the  Provisional  IRA 
(PIRA)  was  bom. 

The  PIRA  vision  was  to  eause  the  eollapse  of  the 
Northern  Ireland  administration  and  to  infliet 
easualties  on  the  British  forees  that  would  foree  the 
British  government,  by  publie  opinion,  to  withdraw 
from  Ireland. 


‘B’  Speeials  disbanded;  Ulster  Defense 
Regiment  formed 

Many  Loyalists  felt  let  down  by  this  appeasement  to 
the  Nationalists  and  a  threat  of  Irish  Unity  from  the 
Hunt  Report  and  the  UVF  started  to  retaliate 
themselves  against  Nationalists  and  ereate  their  own 
‘vigilante’  groups  ealled’  defense  assoeiations.’ 


6  February  1971 

First  British  soldier  killed  by  IRA 

Gunner  Robert  Curtis  was  the  first  British  soldier  to 
have  been  killed  in  Ireland  sinee  1921. 

9  August  1971 

Internment  introdueed 

The  British  Government  reluetantly  agreed  for 
Internment  without  trial  on  the  assumption  that  Law 
and  Order  would  be  restored  without  the 
troublemakers.  Whole  eommunities  were  uprooted, 
300  Catholies  lifted,  0  Protestants.  The  result  after 
Internment  was  that  it  mobilized  IRA  to  target 
Army/Seeurity  Forees  rather  than  just  the  Protestant 
eommunities,  and  resulted  in  a  four-fold  inerease  in 
killings  of  soldiers. 

September  1971 

Ulster  Defense  Assoeiation  (UDA)  ereated 

This  loyalist  and  vigilante  group.  It  was  formed  to 
defend  loyalist  areas  from  attaek  and  to  eombat 
Irish  Republieanism.  It  used  the  Ulster  Freedom 
Fighters  (UFF)  as  its  military  arm. 


30  January  1972 

‘Bloody  Sunday’ 

Soldiers  from  1  Battalion,  The  Paraehute 
Regiment,  open  fire  on  eivil  rights  marehers.  27 
people  wounded,  14  killed.  It  was  one  of  the  most 
signifieant  ineidents  that  alienated  Nationalists  from 
the  British  Army,  who  had  not  yet  signifieantly 
turned  against  them.  The  IRA  swelled  with 

Mareh  1972 

Northern  Ireland  Parliament  dissolved 

Direet  Rule  established  through  the  Northern 
Ireland  Offiee  at  Westminster. 

21  July  1972 

‘Bloody  Friday’ 

IRA  detonates  22  bombs  aeross  Belfast,  9  killed  and 
hundreds  injured. 

31  July  1972 

Operation  MOTORMAN 

Seeurity  Forees  retake  the  ‘no-go’  areas  in  the 
Nationalist  areas  of  Belfast  and  Derry.  Although  it 
inflieted  a  short-term  defeat  on  the  IRA  in  both 
eities,  it  did  not  make  the  organization  any  less 
dangerous  on  other  parts  of  Northern  Ireland. 

9  Deeember  1973 

Sunningdale  Agreement 

This  was  an  attempt  to  establish  a  power-sharing 
Northern  Ireland  Exeeutive  and  a  ‘eross-border’ 
Couneil  of  Ireland. 



May  1974 

Collapse  of  the  Sunningdale  Agreement 

Unionist  opposition,  violence  and  a  loyalist  general 
strike  caused  the  collapse  of  the  Agreement  in  May 

May  1974 

UVF  bombings  in  Dublin 

Shankill  and  Portadown  UVF  units  planted  3  car 
bombs  in  Dublin  without  warning.  33  killed. 

October  &  November 

IRA  bombings  on  mainland  UK 

Bombings  of  two  Guildford  pubs,  4  killed. 
Bombings  of  two  Birmingham  pubs,  19  killed 


9  February  1975  -  23 
January  1976 

IRA  ceasefire 

The  IRA  agreed  to  a  ceasefire  in  February  1975, 
which  lasted  nearly  a  year  before  the  IRA 
concluded  that  the  British  were  drawing  them  into 
politics  without  offering  any  guarantees  in  relation 
to  the  IRA's  goals,  and  hopes  of  a  quick  victory 

Loyalists  were  concerned  that  there  was  a  sell-out 
between  the  British  and  Irish  Governments  and 
feared  for  a  united  Ireland. 

As  a  result,  the  IRA  launched  a  new  strategy  known 
as  "the  Long  War".  This  saw  them  conduct  a  war  of 
attrition  against  the  British  and  increase  emphasis 
on  political  activity,  via  the  political  party  Sinn 


IRA  reorganization  for  ‘The  Long  War’  strategy. 

IRA  reorganization  into  cellular  lines  (Active 
Service  Units)  from  a  larger  conventional  military 
organizational  principle.  It  was  aimed  at  improving 
security  and  operational  capacity.  The  only 
exception  was  the  South  Armagh  Brigade. 

25  March  1976 

Police  Primacy 

The  announcement  that  the  overt  military  lead  in 
security  policy  would  be  scaled  back  in  favor  of 
‘police  primacy’.  The  Intelligence  lead  transferred 
to  the  police  into  Tasking  and  Coordination  Groups 


27  August  1979 

Lord  Mountbatten  killed 

The  IRA  blows  up  Lord  Mountbatten,  the  Queen’s 
cousin  and  former  Chief  of  the  Defense  Staff 

Warrenpoint  bombing 

The  IRA  in  a  double  bomb  attack  near  Warrenpoint 
kills  18  British  Army  soldiers.  It  was  the  most 
successful  and  best  -planned  IRA  attack  on  the 
British  Army  of  the  Troubles. 


5  May  1981 

Hunger  Strikes 

Bobby  Sands  becomes  the  first  of  the  IRA  hunger 
strikers  to  die,  after  66  days’  fasting.  9  other  IRA 
and  INLA  prisoners  follow  suit. 


Secret  talks  with  British  Government 

Gerry  Adams  begins  the  Secret  Talks  with  the 
British  Government. 



15  November  1985 

The  Anglo-Irish  Agreement 

British  and  Irish  governments  sign  the  Anglo-Irish 
Treaty;  start  of  the  ‘Ulster  Says  No’  campaign  (see 
Appendix  E). 


1  November  1986 

Split  of  Sinn  Fein 

Ard  Fheis  (Dublin)  -  birth  of  Republican 
Sinn  Fein 

The  Provisionals  realized  that  they  had  to  enter 
constitutional  politics  as  well  as  fighting  a  war. 
This  meant  recognizing  the  Dublin  Parliament  and 
taking  seats  in  it.  Traditional  Sinn  Fein  wanted  to 
reject  the  institutions  created  by  partition  (Stormont 
and  Dublin  Governments).  The  Provisional  and 
Republican  movement  split. 


8  May  1987 


SAS  kill  8  IRA  terrorists. 

8  November  1987 

Enniskillen  bomb 

The  IRA  detonates  a  no-waming  bomb  next  to  the 
war  memorial  in  Enniskillen,  1 1  killed,  63  injured. 


7  February  1991 

IRA  mortars  10  Downing  Street 

IRA  continues  its  mainland  campaign  in  an  attempt 
to  force  concessions  from  the  British  Government. 


31  August  1994 

IRA  ceasefire  -  ends  its  military  hostilities 

This  saw  the  development  of  the  peace  process. 

The  politics  of  the  conflict  remained  unresolved  and 
there  was  little  movement  towards  an  all-inclusive 
dialogue  at  this  stage.  There  needed  a  peaceful 
background,  a  non-violent  situation  to  offer  the 
prospect  of  permanent  dialogue  rather  than 
increased  polarization. 

13  October  1994 

Loyalist  paramilitaries  announce  ceasefire 


Talks  between  British  and  Irish  government  and  paramilitary 

The  governments  attempted  the  reconciliation  of  the 
seemingly  irreconcilable  in  terms  of  the  political 
problems  of  Northern  Ireland 


9  February  1996 

Canary  Wharf  bomb  -  IRA  ends  ceasefire 

Sinn  Fein’s  entry  into  all-inclusive  talks  was 
delayed.  The  IRA  had  felt  that  they  had  been  duped 
by  the  British  Government  and  could  not  withhold 
frustrations  at  grass  roots  any  longer.  The  mainland 
attacks  purposes  were  simply  to  get  Sinn  Fein  into 
the  negotiations  rather  than  a  united  Ireland 

15  June  1996 

IRA  bombs  Manchester  city  center 


Widespread  civil  disturbance 

Orange  Order  parade  at  Drumcree,  County  Armagh, 
leads  to  widespread  civil  disturbances  across  the 

7  October  1996 

IRA  bombs  British  Army  HQ  in  Lisburn 

Two  5001b  bombs,  1  killed  and  20  injured. 


12  February  1997 

Lance  Bombadier  Stephen  Restorick  killed 
by  South  Armagh  sniper  team 

Last  soldier  to  die  under  Operation  BANNER 

20  July  1997 

IRA  ceasefire 

IRA  reinstates  its  ceasefire.  Political  developments 
resumed  with  the  election  of  a  new  government  in 
Britain  and  Ireland. 



10  April  1998 

The  Belfast/Good  Friday  Agreement 

The  peace  process  arrived  in  April  1998,  as  political 
agreement  was  reached.  This  represented  the 
culmination  of  exhaustive  multi-party, 
intergovernmental  and  bilateral  talks.  At  the  heart 
of  the  agreement  was  the  principle  of  consent  for 
constitutional  change  in  Northern  Ireland. 

May  1998 

Sinn  Fein  Ard  Fheis 

Sinn  Fein  called  a  special  Ard  Fheis  when  delegates 
voted  overwhelmingly  to  allow  successful 
candidates  to  take  their  seats  in  the  proposed 
Assembly  at  Stormont.  As  a  result  of  this  decision, 
the  policy  on  Sinn  Fein  abstentionism  now  only 
applies  to  the  British  parliament  at  Westminster.^^ 

15  August  1998 

Omagh  Bombing 

The  Real  IRA,  the  Republican  splinter  group, 
explodes  a  no-waming  car  bomb  in  Omagh,  County 
Tyrone,  killing  29  people  and  two  unborn  children. 


29  November  1999 

Power- Sharing  executive  appointed 

2  December  1999 

Power  devolved  to  Stormont 

Direct  rule  ends,  power  devolved  to  Stormont  from 


14  October  2002 

Suspension  of  devolution 

IRA  spy  ring  in  Stormont  prompts  the  collapse  of 
the  power-sharing  executive  and  the  suspension  of 
devolution.  This  started  the  longest  suspension 
until  May  2007. 


28  July  2005 

IRA  calls  an  end  to  its  armed  campaign 

IRA  reports  in  the  open  media  that  it  has  allegedly 
decommissioned  the  last  of  its  weapons  and 


October  2006 

St  Andrews  Agreement 

Multi-Party  Talks  (see  Appendix  E). 


8  May  2007 

Devolution  returns  to  Stormont  executive 

Gerry  Adams  and  Ian  Paisley  agree  to  enter  a 
power-sharing  executive. 

31  July  2007 

Operation  BANNER  ends 

October  2007 

MI5  (Security  Service)  took  over  primacy 
for  national  security  intelligence  work  in 
Northern  Ireland.^’ 


Appendix  E 

Summary  of  the  Political  Negotiations  and  Political  Agreements 





Government  of  Ireland  Act  passed 

Partition  of  Ireland  into  North  and  South 

7  June  1921-30 
March  1972 

The  Parliament  of  Northern  Ireland 

The  Parliament  consistently  chose  the  Ulster  Unionist  Party  to 
govern  the  region. 


Republic  of  Ireland  Act 

Staunch  lobbying  from  the  Northern  Ireland  Prime  Minster  Sir 
Basil  Brooke  saw  Northern  Ireland  remain  an  integral  part  of  the 
United  Kingdom.’* 

30  March  1972 

Suspension  of  the  NI  Parliament 
and  the  introduction  of  direct  rule 

The  NI  Parliament  was  initially  suspended  and  then  formally 
abolished  in  1973  under  the  Northern  Ireland  Constitution  Act 
1973.  Civil  servants  in  Whitehall  would  have  to  assume  all  of 
the  responsibilities  previously  exercised  by  the  Northern  Ireland 
Civil  Service  (NICS).” 

9  December  1973 

Sunningdale  initiative 

This  was  an  attempt  to  establish  a  power-sharing  Northern 

Ireland  Executive  and  cross-border  Council  of  Ireland  of  shared 
Protestant  and  Catholic  government  power  sharing. 

-  For  Loyalists  this  was  a  sell-out.  The  Ulster  Workers  Council 
initiated  a  huge  strike;  bringing  down  the  agreement  by 
paralyzing  the  Province,  using  psychological  intimidation  to  the 
public.  Universal  loyalist  support,  of  all  loyalists’  persuasions, 
was  in  revolt.  Northern  Ireland  politicians  in  step  behind  the 

Harold  Wilson  made  his  speech  remarking  that  the  people  of 
Northern  Ireland  were  “spongers.”  The  Province  was  paralyzed; 
loyalists  had  defied  Westminster,  through  a  combination  of 
sheer  numbers,  industrial  muscle  and  paramilitary  power.  They 
had  taken  over  state  and  the  Sunningdale  initiative  was  kicked 
out  and  caused  the  collapse  of  the  initiative  in  May  1974. 


(Secret  Talks) 

Secret  contact  between  British 
Government  and  the  IRA  was 

The  so-called  ‘Christmas-ceasefire’  was  negotiated. 


(Secret  Talks) 

IRA  ceasefire 

Serious  negotiations  on  structures  of  disengagement.  It  was 
neatly  ambiguous  for  both  sides  to  interpret  as  they  wished.  The 
British  Government  had  no  intention  of  a  Political  withdrawal, 
the  Loyalists  began  an  autumn  resurgence,  suspicious  of  a  sell¬ 
out,  and  the  IRA  walked  out. 


(Secret  Talks) 

Hunger  Strike  proposals 

There  was  a  set  of  proposals  to  manage  the  end  of  the  first 
hunger  strike,  but  only  ended  in  revised  prison  rules, 
inflexibility  on  the  part  of  prison  staff  and  management,  rather 
than  the  ‘political  prisoner’  status  the  Republicans  sought. 

15  November 

Anglo-Irish  agreement 

Anglo-Irish  agreement.  Overall,  it  laid  the  foundations  for 
future  progress  through  shared  understandings.  It  promoted 
cross-border  cooperation.  It  did  not  involve  concepts  such  as 
joint  sovereignty  and  limited  Dublin’s  involvement  to  a 
consultative  role. 

Two  principles  were  laid  down  which  have  been  retained  in  all 
subsequent  arrangements:  that  the  Irish  government  should  have 
a  say  in  the  affairs  of  Northern  Ireland;  there  could  be  no  change 


in  the  eonstitutional  status  of  Northern  Ireland  without  the 
eonsent  of  the  majority  (the  ‘eonsent  prineiple’). 

The  Unionists,  who  believed  that  it  gave  Dublin  a  direct 
involvement  with  the  affairs  of  NI,  rejected  it.  They  formed  the 
slogan,  “Ulster  says  no.”'°' 

The  Republicans  believed  that  it  was  aimed  at  blocking  the  rise 
of  Sinn  Fein  and  instead  reward  the  Nationalist  SDLP  who 
rejected  the  use  of  violence. 

9  November  1990 

The  Brooke-Mayhew  Talks: 
Seeretary  of  State  Northern  Ireland 

The  Secretary  of  State  Northern  Ireland,  Peter  Brooke,  declares 
that  Britain  has  no  selfish  strategic  or  economic  interest  in 
Northern  Ireland. 


The  Hume-Adams  Talks 

The  development  of  a  nationalist  position  and  an  understanding 
of  how  the  core  principle  of  self-determination  could  be 


(Seeret  Talks) 

Route  to  Peaee 

This  was  the  British  Government  strategy  to  show  the  IRA  that 
their  only  progress  was  through  the  political  process  of  Sinn 

Fein  and  not  political  violence. 

15  Deeember 

Downing  Street  Declaration 

Downing  Street  Declaration  -  This  established  that  there 
would  be  no  constitutional  change  without  the  agreement  of  the 
people  of  Northern  Ireland:  the  principal  of  consent. 

-  In  June  1993,  the  new  Irish  PM,  Albert  Reynolds,  built  a  broad 
Nationalist  alliance  and  coalition  in  negotiation  with  the  British. 
On  the  3rd  December  1993,  Major/Reynolds  met.  The  position 
of  the  British  was  not  persuaders  for  Irish  Unity,  and  insisted  on 
Unionist  consent  for  any  settlement.  The  Irish  stood  firm  on 

15  December  1993  at  Dublin  Castle  the  deal  was  finally  done. 
Reynolds  got  self-determination  but  in  a  separate  referendum 
north  and  south.  Major  got  his  principal  of  Unionist  consent  but 
the  unions  had  to  be  kept  on  board  otherwise  it  was  worthless. 

The  result  was  a  joint  framework  document,  with  20  drafts. 

This  led  to  the  1st  September  1994  IRA  declaration  of  ceasefire, 
believing  that  the  declaration  was  genuine.  This  started  a  new 
phase,  a  turning  point  in  the  strategy. 

The  IRA  ceasefire  allowed  their  representatives  in  Sinn  Fein  to 
conduct  meaningful  negotiations  at  the  heart  of  the  conflict,  in 
essence  political  space. 

10  April  1998 

Belfast/  Good  Friday  Agreement. 

-  The  Northern  Ireland  Act  1998 

The  Belfast/  Good  Friday  Agreement  (or  Sunningdale  for 
slow  learners!)  was  based  upon  the  principle  of  power  sharing 
under  the  D’Hondt  method  to  ensure  that  Northern  Ireland’s 
largest  political  communities,  the  unionist  and  nationalist 
communities  both  participate  in  governing  the  region. 

Acceptance  of  the  Belfast  Agreement  owed  far  more  to  changes 
in  republicanism  than  any  fundamental  change  in  British  policy 
towards  Northern  Ireland. 

It  instigated  the  Patten  Report,  which  in  Sep  ’99  recommended 

175  major  changes  to  the  RUC,  including  a  name  change,  a 
Policing  Board  and  a  Police  Ombudsman. 


29  November 

Power- Sharing  executive 

IRA  announcement  that  it  is  also  in  contact  with  the 
Decommissioning  Commission 

2  December  1999 

Stormont  rule 

-  Direct  mle  ends,  power  devolved  to  the  Northern  Ireland 
Assembly  at  Stormont  from  Westminster. 

-  The  North-South  Ministerial  Council  and  the  British-Irish 
Ministerial  Council  take  effect. 

-  The  Anglo-Irish  Agreement  is  replaced  by  the  British-Irish 

-  Articles  2  &  3  of  the  Irish  Constitution  are  amended  to  remove 
its  territorial  claim  on  Northern  Ireland. 

February  -  May 

Power  devolved 

Assembly  suspended  over  the  issue  of  decommissioning.  Direct 
rule  imposed  from  Westminster  temporarily  re-imposed  until  the 
IRA  then  announced  that  it  would  put  its  arms  beyond  use. 

June  2001 

Westminster  and  Local 
Government  Elections 

Significant  swing  towards  the  Sinn  Fein  and  Democratic 

Unionist  Party. 

14  October  2002 

Suspension  of  devolution 

IRA  spy  ring  in  Stormont  prompts  the  collapse  of  the  power¬ 
sharing  executive  and  the  suspension  of  devolution. 

13  October  2006 

St  Andrews  Agreement 

The  Northern  Ireland  (St 
Andrews  Agreement)  Act  2006 

The  Northern  Ireland  (St 
Andrews  Agreement)  Act  2007 

An  agreement  between  the  British  and  Irish  Governments  and 
the  political  parties  to  broker  a  deal  on  the  devolution  of  power 
to  Northern  Ireland.  It  set  a  target  date  for  27  March  2007.  Key 
elements  of  the  agreement  were: 

•  Full  acceptance  by  Sinn  Fein  to  support  the  Police 

Service  of  Northern  Ireland,  courts  and  the  mle  of  law 
(devolution  of  policing  and  justice). 

•  Restoration  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Assembly  the 
following  year  with  a  new  Northern  Ireland  Executive. 

•  Commitment  by  the  DUP  to  power  sharing  with 
Republicans  and  Nationalists  in  the  Northern  Ireland 

7  March  2007 

Northern  Ireland  elections 

Northern  Ireland  goes  to  the  polls  to  elect  candidates  to  the 

The  DUP  are  the  largest  party,  winning  36  of  the  108  seats. 

Sinn  Fein  takes  28  seats.  The  UUP  win  18,  the  SDLP  16,  and 
the  Alliance  Party  7  seats. 

8  May  2007 

Devolution  returns  to  Stormont 
executive  (after  almost  5  years) 

Gerry  Adams  and  Ian  Paisley  agree  to  enter  a  power-sharing 

The  Assembly  met  and  elected  Ian  Paisley  and  Martin 
McGuinness  as  First  Minister  and  deputy  First  Minister. 

5  June  2008 

New  First  Minister  -  Peter 

Peter  Robinson  and  Martin  McGuinness  are  appointed  first  and 
deputy  first  ministers  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Assembly.  Mr 
Robinson  was  nominated  by  former  DUP  leader  Ian  Paisley  and 
Mr  McGuinness  by  Sinn  Fein  president  Gerry  Adams 

4  February  2010 

The  Hillsborough  Agreement  - 

Devolution  of  Policing  and  Justice 

DUP  reached  a  deal  with  Sinn  Fein  over  the  devolution  of 
policing  and  justice  powers  from  Westminster  to  Northern 


This  included  the  British  and  Irish  Prime  Ministers  mediating 
talks  at  Hillsborough  25-27  January  2010. 

12  April  2010 

Powers  of  Devolution  and  Justice 
transferred  to  the  Assembly 


5  May  2011 

2011  election  for  the  Northern 
Ireland  Assembly 

Following  the  results  of  the  election,  Peter  Robinson  of  the  DUP 
and  Martin  McGuinness  of  Sinn  Fein  were  nominated  and 
subsequently  re-elected  as  First  Minister  and  deputy  First 

Minister  on  12  May  2011. 

The  DUP  are  the  largest  party,  winning  38  of  the  108  seats. 

Sinn  Fein  takes  28  seats.  The  UUP  win  16,  the  SDLP  14,  and 
the  Alliance  Party  8  seats. 


Appendix  F 

Analysis  of  the  Political  Negotiations  and  Political  Agreements 

Of  all  the  political  agreements,  the  Sunningdale  Agreement  December  1973  was 
the  most  problematic  while  the  Downing  Street  Declaration  of  December  1993  was  the 
most  significant  as  it  laid  the  foundations  for  the  successful  Belfast  Agreement  of  1998. 
The  resilience  of  the  Ulster  Workers  Council  (UWC)  to  strike  in  May  1974  in  protest  to 
the  Sunningdale  Agreement,  inspired  by  the  Vanguard  Party  and  the  DUP,  brought 
Northern  Ireland  to  its  knees.  The  strike  effectively  broke  British  policy  in  Ulster  and 
ensured  Protestant  Unionists  would  not  have  power  sharing  with  a  nationalist  dimension 
thrust  upon  them.  For  the  Downing  Street  Declaration,  the  British  and  Irish 
governments  achieved  in  tortuous  phraseology  to  ‘square  the  circle’  of  Unionist  and 
Republican  rhetoric.  It  established  the  principled  framework  within  which  the  future  of 
Northern  Ireland  could  then  be  discussed.  The  considered  ambiguity  conceded  the 
abstract  principle  of  self-determination  to  the  Irish  people  (the  nationalist  position)  but 
retained  the  operative  principle  of  self-determination  for  the  ‘greater  number’  in  Northern 
Ireland  (the  Unionist  position).  This  enabled  the  launch  pad  for  the  Belfast  Agreement, 
which  marked  the  most  significant  rapprochement  in  Anglo-Irish  relations  since  the 
partition  of  the  island  of  Ireland  in  1921. 


Appendix  G 

The  Mitchell  Principles 

The  Mitchell  Principles  were  six  ground  rules  agreed  by  the  Irish  and  British 
governments  and  the  political  parties  in  Northern  Ireland  regarding  participation  in  talks 
on  the  future  of  the  region.  They  were  named  after  the  Senator  George  Mitchell  who 
chaired  the  all-party  talks.  All  involved  in  the  negotiations  had  to  agree  to  their 

The  principles  appear  in  the  report  of  the  International  Body  on  Arms 


Decommissioning;  Principles  of  Democracy  and  Non-Violence,  January  1996: 

1 .  To  democratic  and  exclusively  peaceful  means  of  resolving  political  issues. 

2.  To  the  total  disarmament  of  all  paramilitary  organizations. 

3.  To  agree  that  such  disarmament  must  be  verifiable  to  the  satisfaction  of  an 
independent  commission. 

4.  To  renounce  for  themselves,  and  to  oppose  any  effort  by  others,  to  use  force,  or 
threaten  to  use  force,  to  influence  the  course  or  the  outcome  of  all-party 

5.  To  agree  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  any  agreement  reached  in  all-party  negotiations 
and  to  resort  to  democratic  and  exclusively  peaceful  methods  in  trying  to  alter  any 
aspect  of  that  outcome  with  which  they  may  disagree. 

6.  To  urge  that  "punishment"  killings  and  beatings  stop  and  to  take  effective  steps  to 
prevent  such  action. 

Lesson  Learnt:  the  reason  why  the  Mitchell  Principles  were  so  successful  is  best 
described  by  Fisher  and  Ury  in  the  book  “Getting  to  Yes:”  “The  more  you  bring 
standards  of  fairness,  efficiency,  or  scientific  merit  to  bear  on  your  particular  problem, 
the  more  likely  you  are  to  produce  a  final  package  that  is  wise  and  fair.”^°^ 


Appendix  H 

Security  Statistics 

The  security  and  stability  of  the  framework  for  peace  is  more  than  just  the 
measurement  of  overt  cases  of  violence  using  security  statistics  for  deaths,  injuries, 
bombings,  shootings,  arrests  and  convictions  but  it  does  provide  a  suitable  framework  for 
analysis.  By  relying  on  these  trends  alone  risks  what  Johann  Galtung  calls  “negative 
peace”  -  that  is  peace  defined  simply  by  the  absence  of  violence. 

1 .  Figure  1,  Arrests  on  suspicion  of  terrorism  in  the  UK  -  2009  and  2010. 

Figures  on  the  left  are  numbers  of  arrests;  figures  along  the  bottom  are  the  terrorist 
related  areas  of  arrest.  This  figure  shows  the  increase  in  the  Northern  Irish  Related 
Terrorism  arrests  in  comparison  to  the  rest  of  UK  arrests. 




( including  AQ 



NIRT  in  Great 

Not  Classified 

•  2009 

•  2010 










2.  Figure  2.  Security  Related  Incidents  (1998  -  2011).  The  following 

statistics  are  from  the  PSNI  for  shooting,  incendiary  and  bombing  incidents  only.''^ 
The  figures  on  the  left  are  number  of  incidents  against  time  on  the  bottom  axis.  It  is 
important  to  note  that  the  Violent  Dissident  Republican  (VDR)  event  activity 
illustrated  at  Figure  6  uses  a  very  different  metric,  across  a  wider  range  of  activities, 
than  this  generalist  PSNI  statistic. 

- 1 - 1  I  I - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 

1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 

Incendiaiy  Devices  used 
^^“Incendiaiy  Incidents 
^  =  Bombings  -  devices  used 
^^“Bombiiig  Incidents 
‘■^“Shooting  Incidents 

The  following  types  of  shooting  incidents  are  included; 

•  Shots  fired  by  terrorists 

•  Shots  fired  by  the  security  forces 

•  Paramilitary-style  attacks  involving  shootings 

•  Shots  heard  (and  later  confirmed) 

•  Other  violent  incidents  where  shots  are  fired  (eg  armed  robbery) 

An  individual  bombing  incident  may  involve  one  or  more  explosive  devices.  Incidents 
recorded  include  explosions  and  defusings  (devices  used).  Incidents  involving  hoax 
devices,  petrol  bombings  or  incendiaries  are  excluded. 

Incidents  recorded  include  explosions  and  defusings  (devices  used). 


3.  Figures,  Firearms  Finds  (1998  -  2011).  The  following  statistics  are 

from  the  PSNl.  The  figures  on  the  left  are  the  number  of  firearms  offences  against 
time.  These  are  stand  alone  statistics  and  cannot  be  assessed  on  their  own  unless  checked 
against  other  forms  of  intelligence  collection  and  arrests,  which  is  beyond  the 
classification  of  this  paper.  What  the  Figure  does  illustrate  is  that  the  number  of  offences 
continues  to  rise  in  the  last  five  years. _ 


1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 

4.  Figure  4,  Explosives  Finds  (1998  -  2011).  The  following  statistics  are 

from  the  PSNL  The  figures  on  the  left  are  the  weight  of  explosive  finds  (kgs) 
against  time.  These  are  stand  alone  statistics  and  cannot  be  assessed  on  their  own 
unless  checked  against  other  forms  of  intelligence  collection  and  arrests,  which  is 
beyond  the  classification  of  this  paper.  What  the  Figure  does  illustrate  is  that  the 
number  of  large  explosive  finds  has  reduced  in  the  last  five  years,  leading  to  more 
high  tech  UVlEDs. _ 

Explosives  (Kgs) 

►Explosives  (Kgs) 

1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011 


5.  Figure  The  following  chart  shows  the  2009/10  range  of  offence  that 

charges  brought  against  persons  detained  in  Northern  Ireland  under  section  41  of  the 
Terrorism  Act  (2006)  by  individual  offence.  It  demonstrates  the  significant  number  of 
offences  that  are  linked  to  violent  terrorist  acts  and  the  mix  of  terrorism  and  criminality 
for  a  police  counter-terrorist  strategy.  Of  those  persons  detained  and  charged,  50%  were 
for  membership,  possession  of  terrorist  purposes  and  collection  of  information. 


-  Min  der 

a  Attempted  Murder 
Explosives  Offences 

-  Firearms  Offences 

-  Conspiracy  to  cause  explosion 

-  Membership 

-  Bni'glaiy 

•  Offences  against  the  pei  son 

Possession  of  Documents  / 

-  Criminal  Damage 


-  Conspiracy  to  pei'vert  justice 

-  Possession  of  offensive  weapon 

Possession  of  articles  of  use  to 



Violent  Dissident  Republican  (VDR)  event  activity. 

a.  Figure  6.'^^  This  illustrates  the  use  of  the  Violent  Dissident  Republiean 
(VDR)  event  aetivity  1997  -  2010.  The  data  supports  the  argument  that  the  threat 
posed  by  VDR  organizations  remains  substantial  with  a  dramatic  rise  in  activity 
for  2009  and  2010.  VDR  as  a  metric  is  outlined  in  more  detail  below,  in  Figure  7. 


b.  Figure  7,'^^  VDR  is  activity  measured  by  type.  The  chart  below  shows 
how  the  different  types  of  activity  for  2010  have  led  to  the  spike  of  VDR  seen 
above.  This  data  indicates  that  the  strategy  of  the  dissident  groups  is  not  just  to 
disrupt  normalization  through  attempted  high-level  bombings  and  hoax  activity, 
but  also  to  use  violence  from  assaults  and  crime  through  robberies  to  demonstrate 
their  own  authority.” 

Number  of  Incidents  in  2010 

-  Shootings  and  Punishment 

■  Defused  Bomb  Incidents 

Ho;ix  Incidents 

-  Detonated  Bomb  Incidents 

Petrol  Bomb  Incidents 
X  Assaults 

Violent  Riots 
Arson  Incidents 
Violent  Robberies 


c.  Figure  8/'^  This  breaks  out  the  VDR  by  grouping.  The  unknown 
perpetrators  are  unattributable  to  any  dissident  Republiean  grouping.  Analysis 
has  proven  that  this  could  be  down  to  RIRA,  consistent  with  previous  patterns  of 
failure  to  immediately  claim  responsibility  for  events  or  simply  media  confusion 
about  the  emergence  of  ONH.  Aside  from  the  attribution  to  a  group,  there 
remains  a  significant  spike  of  attacks  in  2010. 



♦-  •♦ONH 


RIRA  and/or 

RIRA  and/or 

RIRA  and/or 
CIRA  and/or 

RIRA  and/or 

—  —  Unknown 



d.  Figure  9.  This  show  the  bombing  incidents  detonated  and  diffused  from 
1997  to  2010.  This  increase  in  high-level  activity  supports  the  assumption  that 
2010  saw  a  growing  sophistication  in  tactics,  technology,  and  determination  on 
the  part  of  the  dissidents.  This  bombing  data  supports  the  official  rise  in  the  threat 
level  from  moderate  to  substantial. 



e.  Figure  10.  Hoax  devices.  A  defining  tactic  of  the  dissident  groups  has 
been  to  disrupt  the  normalization  of  Northern  Irish  society.  They  have  aimed  to  do 
so  through  the  inducement  of  fear  and  the  disruption  of  routine  activity  through 
their  attacks  and  the  resultant  ongoing  security  alerts  that  intend  to  cause  routine 

f  2011.  Although  figures  for  the  second  half  of  201 1  are  yet  to  be  released, 
there  has  been  a  reduction  from  2010.  Some  analysts,  especially  the  Belfast 
Telegraph,  ascertain  that  this  is  firstly  due  to  turf  wars  within  the  dissident 
groupings.  Secondly  the  reduction  is  down  to  the  success  of  the  security  forces, 
especially  in  the  south  of  Ireland,  where  it  has  made  “serious  intelligence  in-roads 
into  the  three  main  groupings.”  There  have  also  been  suggestions  that  the 
dissident  targeting  has  switched  to  an  “economically  driven  campaign  against 
strategic  capitalist  targets.”  Whatever  the  statistics  for  2011  say,  there  is  still 
incoherence  and  division  amongst  the  dissident  groupings  but  with  a  goal  to  still 
continue  their  “armed  struggle.” 



Figure  11,  Deaths  by  status  of  the  person  killed  (1969  -  1999). 


•  Total  3529. 

.  British  Security  Forces 

»  Civilian  (1842) 

Irish  Security  (10) 

«  Loyalist  ParamilitaiY 

Republican  ParamilitaiY 

8.  At  the  height  of  its  eommitment  in  1973,  the  Security  Forces  had  25,343 

troops  in  Northern  Ireland,  distinctly  more  than  the  9,000  British  troops  in  Afghanistan 

today.  The  most  deadly  year  was  1972,  when  the  IRA  went  on  the  offensive  against 


British  troops;  approximately  130  soldiers  were  killed  in  hostile  action. 


Appenidix  I 

Republican/  Nationalist  Perspective 

The  Republican  position  -  The  motive  for  Irish  Republieanism  has  been  in 
opposition  to  British  rule.  It  alleged  diserimination  and  marginalization  against  Catholics 
by  attempting  to  create  an  impression  of  inferiority  and  subdue/  eliminate  their  cultural 
identity,  and  a  feeling  that  Ireland  was  economically  disadvantaged  and  subservient  to  the 
United  Kingdom. 

From  the  late  1940’s,  there  was  a  distinct  lack  of  nationalists  in  the  political 
process  able  to  achieve  the  abolition  of  the  border  in  a  peaceful  manner.  As  a  result  a 
more  militant  Republicanism  quickly  usurped  constitutional  nationalism.  In  1969,  there 
was  a  nationalist  community  perception  that  they  were  at  war.  At  a  Sinn  Fein/  IRA  Ard 
Fheis  in  January  1970,  the  Republican  movement  formally  split.  The  dissidents’  who  left 
in  favor  of  a  more  proactive  defense  of  beleaguered  Catholic  communities  became  known 
as  the  Provisionals  and  they  began  its  all-out  offensive  against  what  it  claimed  was 
British  occupation.  The  IRA  that  was  left  called  itself  the  Official  Irish  Republican 
Army,  rejecting  the  political  legitimacy  of  the  Provisionals. 

Republican  strategy  -  The  Provisional  IRA  strategy  of  Republican  action  has 


remained  “the  unswerving  commitment  to  the  armed  struggle”. 

•  The  ‘Initial  Phase’  of  1970  -  1972  -  This  was  what  the  Security  Forces 
termed  as  the  insurgency  phase.  1972  was  the  worst  year  of  the  Troubles.  In 
total,  the  IRA  carried  out  1,200  operations  that  year,  bidding  to  make  Northern 
Ireland  unstable  and  hasten  the  departure  of  the  British  state.  By  1975,  the 
hope  of  a  PIRA  quick  military  victory  was  low.  A  ceasefire  was  negotiated,  the 


IRA  believing  that  this  was  the  start  of  a  long-term  proeess  of  British  withdrawal. 
The  eeasefire  was  troublesome  for  the  IRA  as  it  led  to  infiltration  by  informers, 
the  arrest  of  many  aetivists  and  a  breakdown  of  IRA  diseipline.  By  early  1976, 
the  IRA  leadership,  short  of  money,  weapons  and  members,  broke  off  the 

•  The  Long  War  -  Under  the  leadership  of  Gerry  Adams,  there  was  a 
transformation  of  the  IRA.  It  evolved  a  new  strategy  termed  the  ‘Long  War,’ 
which  underpinned  IRA  strategy  for  the  rest  of  the  Troubles.  The  IRA  was 
restructured,  redefined  and  an  increased  emphasis  on  a  political  strategy  with 
violence  to  achieve  their  aims  (bullet  and  ballot  box),  maintaining  a  propaganda 
war  using  Sinn  Fein  as  the  voice  of  the  Republican  movement. 

•  Political  Violence/  Hunger  Strikes  -  The  Republican  hunger  strike  in  the 
Maze  prison  in  1981,  to  recognize  the  Republican  prisoners  as  ‘political 
status’/prisoners  of  war,  led  to  the  death  of  ten  IRA  and  INLA,  including  Bobby 
Sands  who  had  been  elected  as  a  Member  of  Parliament  for  Fermanagh  and  South 
Tyrone.  Sands’  death  was  the  watershed  for  the  Republican  movement.  It 
generated  influence  and  national  and  international  media  interest.  More 
significantly  as  an  unexpected  byproduct  of  the  hunger  strike,  it  proved  what 
Gerry  Adams  had  long  argued  might  be  possible,  of  convincing  Republicans,  of 
the  value  of  electoral  politics  much  sooner  than  expected.  Adams  recognized 
from  this  that  the  nationalists  had  a  reservoir  of  support  that  if  skillfully  tapped, 
could  build  the  broad  political  base  with  a  credible  political  strategy  that  he 


believed  was  neeessary  to  move  the  cause  forward  alongside  their  terrorist 

•  Electoral  Strategy  -  The  Republican  electoral  strategy  then  developed 
and  by  1985  Sinn  Fein  had  flourished  and  won  12%  of  the  vote  in  the  council 
elections.  Sinn  Fein  was  on  the  rise  while  IRA  was  being  contained.  The  Tong 
war’  strategy  had  exacted  a  heavy  toll  from  the  Republican  community  in  terms 
of  lives,  prison  sentences  and  quality-of-life  opportunities.'^^  It  was  matched  by  a 
dramatic  increase  in  loyalist  assassinations  of  Republicans  in  the  early  1990s. 

The  Republican  use  of  violence  was  becoming  counter-productive,  risking 
alienating  nationalist  and  Republicans’  core  support.  Political  violence  started  to 
lead  to  exclusion,  demonization  and  lack  of  legitimacy.  This  led  to  the  Sinn 

Fein  leader  and  the  SDLP  leader  John  Hume  conceptualizing  a  political  strategy 
for  nationalist  unity. 

•  Exporting  Republicanism  -  Throughout  this  Republican  strategy 
transition,  the  IRA  continued  to  export  Republicanism.  The  IRA/Libya 
connection  smuggled  a  considerable  amount  of  weaponry,  ammunition  and 
military  capability  that  transformed  the  IRA’s  tactical  operations.  In  an 
attempt  to  exert  more  political  concessions  from  the  British  Government  the  IRA 
bombed  or  threatened  security  forces  in  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  Gibraltar  and 
Great  Britain,  opening  new  fronts  in  the  terror  campaign.  They  also  sought 
support  from  Irish  diaspora  communities  abroad,  in  particular  from  the  United 
States,  whose  sympathizers  provided  financial  and  moral  support,  as  well  as 




•  The  Belfast  Agreement  of  1998.  The  important  reality  was  that 
Republieans  had  aeknowledged  and  aceepted  that  there  was  a  ehoiee  other  than 
political  violence  and  that  it  was  a  choice  that  most  of  the  leadership  had  made  to 
mark  a  “generational  truce.”  For  Republicans,  the  acceptance  of  the  consent 
principle  was  justified  by  the  belief  that  the  framework  for  peace  was  only  a 
temporary  construct  and  would  give  way  in  time  to  a  united  Ireland  once 
demographics  prevailed  in  favor  of  the  catholic  majority.  Nationalists  are  still  on 
this  journey.  In  contrast,  Totalitarian  Republicanism  will  always  believe  in  the 
armed  struggle  to  achieve  constitutional  nationalism  of  a  united  Ireland.  This 
extremist  view  perceives  that  the  acceptance  of  the  Belfast  Agreement  marked  the 
Provisional  IRAs’  great  historical  betrayal 


Appendix  J 

Loyalist/  Unionist  perspective 

The  Unionist  position  -  The  motive  for  unionists  has  always  been  to  resist  any 
attempt  to  foree  Home  Rule  from  Ireland  upon  them,  fighting  the  nationalists  attempting 
to  hasten  Britain’s  total  disengagement,  while  the  British  Government  have  always  hinted 
at  a  steady  proeess  of  disengagement  in  Ireland  sinee  World  War  I.  The  resolve  of 
Unionists  in  maintaining  the  link  with  Great  Britain  has  been  for  a  variety  of  eeonomie, 


soeial  and  politieal  reasons. 

The  Loyalist  position  -  The  establishment  of  the  Ulster  Volunteer  Force  was  to 
protect  the  Unionists  and  the  project  of  Home  Rule  for  Ireland  floundered  amid  the 
staunch  opposition  of  Ulster  Unionists.  The  coercive  nature  of  the  Unionist  demands  was 
persuasive,  dictated  primarily  by  the  need  to  prevent  anger  boiling  over  into  reprisals. 

The  re-establishment  of  the  UVF  in  November  1965  re-instigated  the  loyalist 
paramilitary  structure,  boosted  further  by  the  Ulster  Defense  Association  (UDA)  by  1971. 

Loyalism  -  In  the  1960s,  if  there  was  one  trigger  that  unleashed  the  loyalist 
sectarian  ‘genie’,  it  was  the  fundamentalist  Presbyterian  preacher,  the  Reverend  Ian 
Paisley.  He  saw  the  growing  rapprochement  between  the  Unionist  Stormont  government 
and  Dublin  as  a  treachery  and  a  betrayal  of  the  Protestant  faith,  Protestant  Ulster  and  the 
unionist  intransigent  position  that  he  would  become  infamous  for.  His  leadership  alone 
voiced  the  strong  resentment  of  the  Ulster  people,  more  so  than  any  leading  Unionist 
leader  at  the  time.  He  created  the  Ulster  Protestant  Volunteers  (UVP)  as  his  support  to 
attack  the  liberal  leaning  policies  of  Terence  O’Neill  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Parliament, 
who  had  promised  to  “transform  the  face  of  Ulster”  but  O’Neill  fatally  misunderstood  the 



dynamics  of  sectarianism.  Although  his  political  rhetoric  never  endorsed  seetarian 
violenee,  Paisley  would  use  his  leadership  and  influenee  to  ineite  anger  and  fury  towards 
the  nationalist  eommunity.  He  flirted  with  the  loyalist  paramilitaries  on-and-off 
throughout  his  eareer  to  further  his  own  gains,  whilst  never  overtly  supporting  their 
aetions,  ranging  from  the  UVF,  the  UVP  to  the  Ulster  Resistanee.  Protestant  militaney 
emerged  as  a  formidable  foree  in  Northern  Ireland  on  the  streets  and  then  into  polities. 

Loyalist  strategy  -  The  Loyalist  strategy  throughout  was  the  defense  of  their 
Protestant  Ulster  and  to  reaet  to  the  eonfliet  of  Irish  Republieans  on  their  eommunities. 
The  publie  pereeption  was  that  if  the  security  forces  eould  not  defend  them,  they  would 
have  to  do  it  themselves.  As  a  result  the  paramilitaries  were  thought  of  as  defenders  of 
their  eommunities  rather  than  psyehopaths  or  killers.  At  a  taetieal  level  Loyalist 
paramilitaries  did  not  possess  the  same  degree  of  teehnieal  sophistieation  that  marked  the 
Provisional  IRA  out  as  a  deadly  organization.  However,  this  made  them  no  less 
dangerous.  In  the  early  70s,  the  eonstant  Loyalist  attacks  failed  to  degrade  the  nationalist 
popular  support  for  the  IRA,  instead  it  strengthened  its  status.  By  the  1980s  and  early 
1990s,  they  had  shifted  from  a  random  sectarian  campaign  of  violence  to  a  more  focused 
and  eoordinated  effort  to  assassinate  Republicans.  Accused  of  eollusion  with  the 
Seeurity  Forees,  Sir  John  Stevens,  the  former  Metropolitan  Poliee  Commissioner, 
undertook  investigations  as  to  some  of  the  Ulster  Freedom  Fighters  (UFF)  murders 
between  1987  and  2003.  His  report  coneluded:  “. .  .there  was  eollusion  in  both  murders 
and  the  eireumstanees  surrounding  them.  Collusion  is  evideneed  in  many  ways.  This 
ranges  from  the  willful  failure  to  keep  reeords,  the  absence  of  aceountability,  the 
withholding  of  intelligenee  and  evidenee,  through  to  the  extreme  of  agents  being 



involved  in  murder.”  While  loyalism  had  aequired  a  greater  military  eapaeity,  it  also 
developed  a  more  sophistieated  leadership. 

Electoral  strategy  -  The  Progressive  Unionist  Party  (PUP)  and  the  Ulster 
Demoeratie  Party  (UDP)  often  appeared  more  pragmatie  and  willing  to  eompromise  than 
the  eonstitutional  unionist  parties.  Key  to  the  Unionist  eampaign  throughout  the 
Troubles  was  the  threat  of  its  raw  strength  of  protest  (evident  in  both  the  Sunningdale  and 
Anglo-Irish  Agreements).  Unionist  paranoia  has  always  feared  that  they  only  have  to 
be  unlueky  onee,  that  they  only  have  to  make  one  serious  error  of  judgment,  and  the  pass 
to  Irish  unity  would  be  sold.'"^^  As  an  emerging  Peaee  Proeess  developed,  unionist 
members  of  the  business  seetor,  eivil  soeiety  as  well  as  influential  members  of  the  Ulster 
Unionist  Party  sought  a  eloser  engagement  with  the  politieal  proeess.  The  Demoeratie 
Unionist  Party  (DUP)  was  intransigent,  by  maintaining  a  positional  bargaining 
strategy, unwilling  to  aeeept  the  admission  of  Sinn  Fein,  boyeotting  inter-party  talks. 
The  Peaee  Proeess  divided  unionism  between  the  pragmatists  and  the  traditionalists,  this 
division  was  still  evident  at  the  reeent  devolution  of  Polieing  and  Justiee  in  2010.  The 
division  of  unionism  alone  was  one  of  the  eauses  for  the  eonfliet  to  be  so  intraetable. 


Appendix  K 

British  Government  and  Security  Force  perspective 

The  Security  Force  position  -  The  key  objective  for  the  Security  Forces  was  to 
stabilize  the  situation  to  facilitate  a  political  settlement. 

The  COIN  Strategy  -  The  Security  Forces  strategy  started  as  largely  widespread 
maintenance  of  law  and  order.  Initially  the  Army  kept  a  tentative  peace;  but  the  decision 
in  1971  by  the  IRA  to  go  on  the  offensive  saw  the  Security  Forces  (that  included  the 
police  and  military)  respond  with  a  counter-insurgency  drive  against  the  insurgents. 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Harry  Tuzo,  General  Officer  Commanding  (GOC)  Northern 
Ireland  between  1971  and  1973  perceptively  concluded:  “the  hard  fact  is  that  in  guerilla 
war  the  enemy  holds  the  initiative  for  large  parts  of  the  time  and  information  is  the  key  to 
defeat.” Without  the  flow  of  key  sections  of  the  population,  the  flow  of  information 
soon  dried  up. 

The  Counter-Terrorism  Strategy  -  Successive  British  Governments  tried  to  end 
the  bloodshed  with  a  variety  of  political  solutions,  even  talking  to  the  IRA,  all  of  which 
had  failed.  It  was  clear  that  by  1976,  politics  had  reached  a  dead-end  and  that  the  IRA 
was  determined  to  carry  on  killing.  The  Government  made  security  its  principal  line  of 
operation  and  intelligence  gathering  became  a  priority.  The  new  “Way  Ahead” 
security  policy,  known  as  Police  Primacy  meant  that  the  RUC  would  assume  the  lead  and 
the  Army  subordinate.  This  had  political  and  presentational  attractions  from  the 
British  Government’s  viewpoint:  no  homeland  war  had  to  be  declared,  RUC  confidence 
would  be  restored  and  place  the  police  back  on  the  front  foot  to  start  the  long  road  to 


normalization.  This  started  essential  tripartite  eohesion  and  coordination  between  the 
Northern  Ireland  Office  (NIO),  RUC  and  the  Army. 

Police  Primacy  -  From  1977,  the  Army’s  role  was  scaled  back  to  provide  military 
support  to  the  police  in  counter-terrorist  operations;  special  operations  became  the  cutting 
edge,  with  an  evidence-based  approach  to  counter  terrorism.  The  appointment  of  Roy 
Mason  as  the  new  Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland  in  1976  radically  bolstered  the 
special  operations  forces  with  Special  Air  Service  and  Special  Duties  covert  units. 
Mason’s  focus  was  covert  action  and  the  secret  war  against  the  IRA.  The  strategy  was 
for  “reassurance,  deterrence  and  attrition.  Overt  activities  reassured,  by  dominating  the 
ground  in  the  hope  of  raising  public  confidence  in  the  security  forces,  and  deterred  by 
show  of  force,  denying  the  terrorists  the  space  to  operate  on;  covert  operations  caused 

Targeting  -  The  difficulty  in  the  counter  terrorist  targeting  was  the  balance  in 
maintaining  the  stability  of  the  paramilitary  leadership,  to  leave  them  in  place  long 
enough  to  secure  credibility  and  influence  to  negotiate  with,  versus  destroying  their 
ability  to  destabilize  the  road  to  peace  using  political  violence.  In  order  to  create  the 
political  space,  different  strategies  were  used  against  different  individuals  and  groupings 
from  coercing,  cajoling  and  enticing  into  eventually  suing  for  peace. 

The  Security  Force  effects  -  This  effective  combination  of  military  operations 
led  to  significant  attrition  of  the  terrorist  groups,  an  undermining  of  the  terrorists  purpose 
from  within  their  own  popular  support  and  a  growing  public  recognition  of  the  futility  of 
paramilitary  activity.  It  forced  the  IRA  back  to  the  negotiating  table  in  the  early  ‘90’s. 
The  Security  Forces  held  the  line  with  a  battle  of  wills  against  the  Republican  and 


Loyalist  terrorist  groups.  The  impaet  of  the  Seeurity  Forees  allowed  a  wider  and  strategie 

1 52 

plan  to  be  implemented  and  developed. 



Ard  Fheis 

Sinn  Eein  Gonference 


Gontinuity  Irish  Republican  Army 


Democratic  Unionist  Party 


European  Union 


Gaelic  Athletic  Association 


General  Officer  Gommanding 


Historical  Enquiries  Team 


Irish  Republican  Army 


Eoyalist  Volunteer  Eorce 


Member  of  Parliament 


Northern  Ireland  Givil  Rights  Association 


Northern  Ireland  Givil  Service 


Northern  Ireland  Executive 


Northern  Ireland  Office 


Official  Irish  Republican  Army 


Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army 


Police  Service  of  Northern  Ireland 


Progressive  Unionist  Party 


Royal  Irish  Regiment 


Real  Irish  Republican  Army 


Republican  Sinn  Eein 


Royal  Ulster  Gonstabulary 


Special  Air  Service 


Social  Democratic  and  Eabor  Party 


Sinn  Eein 


Ulster  Defense  Association 


Ulster  Democratic  Party 


Ulster  Defense  Regiment 


Ulster  Ereedom  Eighters 


United  Kingdom  Unionist  Party 


Ulster  Unionist  Party 


Ulster  Volunteer  Eorce 


Ulster  Protestant  Volunteers 


Ulster  Workers  Gouncil 



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^  Roger  MacGinty,  “Northern  Ireland:  A  Peace  Process  thwarted  by  Accidental  Spoiling,”  in 
Challenges  to  Peace  Building,  ed.  Edward  Newman  and  Oliver  Richmond,  153-172  (Tokyo, 
Japan:  United  Nations  University  Press,  2006),  154. 

^  Orangeism  is  derived  from  the  Orange  Institution  (more  commonly  known  as  the  Orange  Order 
or  Orange  Lodge).  It  is  a  Protestant  fraternal  organization  based  mainly  in  Northern  Ireland  and 
Scotland.  Politically,  it  is  strongly  linked  to  unionism. 

^  Explanations  of  why  discrimination  occurred  differ  over  three  main  issues:  (1)  the  value  of 
Protestant  privileges,  (2)  the  extent  of  Protestant  unity  across  social  classes,  (3)  the  role,  if  any,  of 
the  British  Government,  in  promoting  sectarianism. 

Aaron  Edwards,  Essential  Histories.  The  Northern  Ireland  Troubles;  Operation  BANNER 
1969-2007  (Oxford,  United  Kingdom:  Osprey  Publishing  Ltd,  201 1),  7. 

^  Edwards,  27. 

Edwards,  29. 

^  Peter  Taylor,  Loyalists  (BBC2,  United  Kingdom:  2000). 

*  Carl  von  Clausewitz,  On  War,  ed  and  trans  by  Michael  Howard  and  Peter  Paret,  (Princetown, 

NJ:  Princetown  University  Press,  1976),  89. 

^  Christopher  Bassford  and  Edward  J.  Villacres,  “Reclaiming  the  Clausewitzian  Trinity,” 
Parameters,  the  journal  of  the  U.S.  Army  War  College,  Autumn,  1995,  3.  It  is  this  work  from 
Bassford  that  connects  the  Northern  Ireland  conflict  into  a  trinity,  rather  than  the  “non-trinitarian” 
Martin  van  Creveld  and  John  Keegan  explanation  that  consigns  Clausewitz  to  irrelevance. 

There  is  risk  that  this  over  simplifies  the  complexity  of  the  terrorist  groupings.  Categorizing 
Republican  and  Loyalist  as  simply  “non-rational  actors”  ignores  some  of  the  deliberate  terrorist 
strategies  laid  out  in  Appendix  I  (Republican),  and  Appendix  J  (Loyalist).  The  second  and  third 
order  effects  of  their  strategies  did  indeed  lead  to  non-rational  action. 

"  John  Wilsey,  The  Ulster  Tales  -  A  tribute  to  those  who  served  1969  -  2000  (South  Yorkshire, 
United  Kingdom:  Pen  &  Sword,  2011),  123. 

Roger  MacGinty,  and  John  Darby,  Guns  and  Government  -  The  Management  of  the  Northern 
Ireland  Peace  Process  (New  York,  United  States:  Palgrave,  2002),  21. 

Ministry  of  Defence,  Security  and  Stabilisation:  The  Military  Contribution  (Joint  Doctrine 
Publication  3-40:  Development,  Concepts  and  Doctrine  Centre,  November  2009),  170.  This 
defines  Decisive  Condition  as:  “a  specific  combination  of  circumstances  deemed  necessary  to 
achieve  or  support  the  desired  condition.” 

Roger  MacGinty,  “Northern  Ireland:  A  Peace  Process  thwarted  by  Accidental  Spoiling,”  in 
Challenges  to  Peace  Building,  ed.  Edward  Newman  and  Oliver  Richmond,  153-172  (Tokyo, 
Japan:  United  Nations  University  Press,  2006),  156. 

MacGinty,  &  Darby,  4. 

Roger  Fisher  and  William  Ury,  Getting  to  Yes  -  Negotiating  Agreement  Without  Giving  In, 
(Middlesex,  United  Kingdom:  Penguin  Books  Ltd:  1983),  7. 

’’  In  comparison  the  Northern  Ireland  Progress  Monitoring  Report  2012  breaks  the  dimensions  of 
the  peace  process  into  four  distinct  but  interlocking  dimensions  of  Security,  Equality,  Political 
progress,  and  Cohesion  and  Sharing. 

It  is  the  author’s  opinion  that  the  assurance  from  the  Independent  International  Commission  on 
Decommissioning  (II CD)  and  the  announcement  from  the  IRA  that  their  “arms  had  been  put 
beyond  use,”  is  still  a  source  of  huge  ambiguity.  The  issue  of  decommissioning  was  vital  to 
progress  the  framework  for  peace,  but  to  what  level  of  decommissioning?  There  is  still  no  open 
source  evidence  of  paramilitary  decommissioning  or  true  definition  of  what  condition  has  been 
met  to  progress  the  peace  process.  Many  media  reports  still  state  that  the  paramilitary  weapons 
and  munitions  are  simply  locked  away  in  secure  bunkers.  Instead  it  was  simply  a  risk  mitigation 


process  for  Republican  movement,  essentially  how  much  did  they  have  to  bargain  for  political 

'^Edwards,  10. 

Oliver  Ramsbotham  in  Contemporary  Conflict  Resolution,  214,  explains  that  as  the  conflict  is 
brought  to  an  end  by  a  peace  process,  its  essence  lies  precisely  in  the  effort  to  persuade 
undefeated  conflict  parties  that  their  persisting  and  undiminished  aims  can  best  be  served  by  non¬ 
violent  politics  rather  than  violence.  This  cessation  of  violence  is  traded  for  other  commodities, 
such  as  political  opportunity  through  inclusion.  This  is  the  “continuation  of  war  into  politics.” 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  176. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  171. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  177. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  24. 

Edwards,  14. 

British  and  Irish  Governments,  The  Framework  Documents  -  A  New  Framework  For 
Agreement,  by  the  British  and  Irish  Governments  (Eondon:  Prime  Minister's  Office,  22  February 

Edwards,  73. 

First  visit  was  in  30  November  1995,  15  months  after  the  IRA’s  first  ceasefire.  Second  visit 
was  following  the  dissident  Republican  bombing  in  Omagh.  Third  visit  was  12  December  2000 
attempting  to  break  the  political  deadlock  threatening  the  power-sharing  executive. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  25. 

The  Belfast  Telegraph,  “Bill  Clinton  visits  Northern  Ireland  with  plan  for  economic  recovery,”,  September  30,  2010, 
1496241  l.html  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

Since  May  2011,  the  position  of  US  Special  Envoy  for  Economic  Affairs  in  Northern  Ireland 
has  not  been  fdled  since  the  resignation  of  Declan  Kelly.  In  a  leaked  Wikileak  cable  he  was 
alleged  to  have  conveyed  the  message  that  the  Northern  Ireland  region’s  business  community  and 
political  leaders  had  become  too  reliant  on  “Santa’s  sacks.” 

Peter  Taylor,  The  Secret  Peacemaker  (BBC2,  United  Kingdom:  26  March  2008). 

Wilsey,  158. 

Kevin  King,  Words  Over  War  -  Mediation  and  Arbitration  to  Prevent  Deadly  Conflict,  ed. 
Melanie  C.  Greenberg,  John  H.  Barton  and  Margaret  E.  McGuinness  (Maryland:  Rowman  & 
Eittlefield,  2000),  206. 

Colonel  (Retd)  Michael  Crawshaw,  “The  Evolution  of  British  COIN".  Joint  Doctrine 
Publication  3-40:  19. 

Brian  A.  Jackson,  “Countering  Intelligence  in  a  ‘Eong  War’  -  The  British  Experience  in 
Northern  Ireland,”  Military  Review  (January-February  2007):  75. 

Preventing  violence  in  the  first  instance  should  be  via  a  policy  of  prevention,  mastery  of 
terrorist  tactics,  techniques  and  procedures,  minimum  force,  rule  of  law,  controlling  territory  and 
a  denial  of  the  emotional  factors  terrorism  feeds  off. 

Op  BANNER,  8-15. 

Edwards,  14. 

^"Wilsey,  123. 

The  concessions  made  by  unionists  at  the  Belfast  Agreement  were  immediate  and  apparent, 
early  release  of  prisoners,  admission  of  Sinn  Fein  into  the  Assembly,  north-south  institutions  and 
reform  of  the  RUC.  In  contrast  concessions  made  by  Republicans,  were  theoretical  and  deferred. 
This  was  the  principle  of  consent  and  revision  of  the  Irish  constitution. 


Jonathan  Tonge,  ""Northern  Ireland:  Conflict  and  Change,  ”  (Harlow,  United  Kingdom: 

Pearson  Edueation  Limited,  2002),  213. 

Jonathon  Evans,  16  Sep  10. 

HM  Government,  ""A  Strong  Britain  in  an  Age  of  Uncertainty  -  The  National  Security 
Strategy,  ”  (October,  2010),  29. 

The  United  Kingdom  is  ranked  only  26*  out  of  153  countries  in  the  Global  Peace  Index  (GPI), 
which  is  produced  annually.  The  GPI  provides  an  annual  ranking  of  the  countries  of  the  world  in 
terms  of  their  proximity  to  peace,  and  stresses  its  relevance  to  global  capital. 

HM  Government,  ""Securing  Britain  in  an  Age  of  Uncertainty  -  The  Strategic  Defence  and 
Security  Review,  ”  (October,  2010),  42. 

HM  Government,  “CONTEST:  The  United  Kingdom ’s  strategy  for  countering  terrorism,  ”  (The 
Stationary  Office:  July,  2011),  26. 

Paul  Nolan,  ""Northern  Ireland  Peace  Monitoring  Report  -  Number  One,”  (Belfast,  Community 
Relations  Council:  February,  2012),  43. 

Dissident  Republican  strategy  (Real  IRA,  Continuity  IRA  &  Oglaigh  na  hEireann  (OnH))  is 
threefold:  (1)  Dissident  Republicans  completely  reject  any  negotiation  with  the  British 
government  on  the  issue  of  Northern  Ireland,  (2)  Dissident  Republicans  view  the  Belfast 
Agreement  as  a  capitulation,  viewed  at  constraining  the  Republican  movement,  and  take  a  zero- 
sum  approach  to  Irish  unification,  (3)  Dissident  Republicans  seek  the  dissolution  of  the  Northern 
Irish  Assembly  and  reject  any  cross-community  arrangements. 

Jane’s  Intelligence  Review,  “Broken  Peace,  Violence  Returns  to  Northern  Ireland,  ”,  November  2011,  8  -  13,  10. 

The  108-member  Stormont  Assembly  does  not  have  any  dissident  representatives,  and  neither 
does  the  1 66-seat  Irish  Parliament.  All  the  key  institutions  in  Irish  society  are  vehemently 
opposed  to  the  dissidents,  including  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Gaelic  Athletic  Association 
(GAA).  Given  this,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  support  for  the  dissidents  is  going  to  grow  radically; 
at  the  same  time,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  the  threat  going  away. 

Jocelyn  Evans,  and  Jonathon  Tonge,  “Menace  without  mandate?  Is  there  any  sympathy  for 
‘Dissident’ Irish  Republicanism  in  Northern  Ireland?”  (Terrorism  and  Political  Violence,  no 
24:1,2012),  76. 

As  Paul  Nolan  describes  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Peace  Monitoring  Report,  these  are  from  areas 
of  high  social  disadvantage  with  a  prevalence  of  anti-social  behavior.  This  has  created  a  market 
of  opportunity  for  the  recruitment  of  individuals  who  wish  to  present  themselves  as  ‘community 

Roger  MacGinty,  161. 

Tongue,  Jonathon,  “They  haven ’t  gone  away  you  know.  Irish  Republican  Dissidents  and 
Armed  Struggle,  ”  (Terrorism  and  Political  Violence,  no  16:3,  2004),  690. 

Common  forms  of  criminality  could  include  drug-dealing,  smuggling,  drink-driving,  fuel¬ 
laundering,  petty  criminality,  fraud,  counter-feit. 

While  the  Patten  target  of  30%  has  been  reached  for  police  officers,  only  27.3%  of  all  PSNI 
personnel  are  Catholic,  as  against  estimates  of  46%  for  the  adult  population. 

Vincent  Kearney,  “Temporary  staff  was  seen  a  ‘short-term  fix’,  former  senior  police  say,”,  30  January  2012,  (accessed 
06  April  2012). 

Of  the  304  rehired  officers  the  breakdown  is  as  follows:  63  in  Intelligence  Branch,  59  in  serious 
crime  and  terrorism,  19  in  Specialist  Operations. 

O’Neill,  P,  “IRA  Statement  on  Putting  Arms  Beyond  Use,”  statement  released  to  the  BBC 
News  Channel  on  26*  September  2005. 

David  Cameron.  Bloody  Sunday  report  published  in  the  House  of  Commons.  15  June  2010. 


The  opportunity  for  reasoned  discussion  about  how  the  past  should  be  handled  was  lost  in  the 
furore  surrounding  the  2009  report  of  the  Consultative  Group  on  the  Past  -  largely  because  of  a 
clause  which  suggested  a  one-off  payment  to  all  families  who  had  lost  someone  in  ‘the  Troubles,’ 
regardless  of  whether  that  person  was  seen  as  a  victim  or  a  perpetrator. 

®  Her  Majesty’s  Treasury  in  March  2011  stated,  “Peace  has  not  in  itself  been  sufficient  to  raise 
Northern  Ireland  prosperity  to  the  UK  average.  Northern  Ireland  still  has  one  of  the  weakest 
economies  in  the  UK.” 

Nolan,  32. 

Department  of  Finance  and  Personnel,  “Northern  Ireland  Index  of  Production  -  Quarter  2 
2011”,  October  12,  201 1,  q2  2011  statistical  bulletin  2.pdf.  accessed  06  April  2012. 

“  Nolan,  32. 

Sir  David  Richards,  Address  at  RUSI  by  the  Chief  of  Defence  Staff, 
http://www.rusi.Org/events/past/ref:E4EA01B5272990/.  December  12,  2011. 

Some  nationalists  continue  to  press  for  more  progress  in  the  area  of  human  rights  and  equality, 
arguing  in  particular  that  Northern  Ireland  needs  its  own  Bill  of  Rights  and  an  Irish  Eanguage 

®  MacGinty  &  Darby,  127. 

™  Nolan,  134. 

The  Special  Support  Program  for  Peace  and  Reconciliation  in  Northern  Ireland  and  the  Border 
Region  of  Ireland  takes  in  the  counties  of  Cavan,  Donegal,  Eeitrim,  Eouth,  Monaghan,  and  Sligo. 

Mark  Devenport,  “Is  a  new  tranche  of  peace  money  on  the  cards  for  NI,”,  June  27, 
2011,  http :// CO. uk/news/uk-northem- Ireland- 13925081  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

Wilsey,  139. 

Nama  was  set  up  by  the  Irish  government  as  part  of  the  response  to  the  country's  banking  and 
property  crisis.  Its  role  is  to  buy  and  then  manage  property  loans,  which  had  been  made  by  the 
Dublin-based  banks.  The  main  reason  given  for  setting  up  Nama  is  that  it  would  take  an 
enormous  weight  of  bad  loans  from  the  banks  and  allow  them  to  increase  lending  to  viable 

Jim  Fitzpatrick,  “Nama’s  impact  on  Northern  Ireland  property  market,”,  28  July 
2011,  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

The  British  Banking  Association,  in  its  search  to  inspire  confidence  in  the  Northern  Ireland 
banking  sector,  has  called  for  a  Nama-style  hank  in  Northern  Ireland. 

Southern  Ireland  is  part  of  the  single  currency,  compared  to  Northern  Ireland,  which  still  holds 
the  British  pound.  Significant  differences  include  company/  corporate  tax,  which  is  12.5%  in 
southern  Ireland  in  spite  of  the  country’s  economic  bailout  and  28%  in  the  UK  and  Northern 
Ireland.  Business  commentators  state  that  this  is  sifting  inward  investment.  If  the  tax  is  brought 
into  line  with  the  south,  it  could  invigorate  the  economy  and  for  Stormont  to  control  it  rather  than 
the  UK  Exchequer. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  134. 

Northern  Ireland  Executive,  “Economic  Strategy  -  Priorities  for  sustainable  growth  and 
prosperity,”  (November,  2011),  5. 

This  analysis  had  been  supported  recently  (Febmary  24,  2012),  by  Jim  Fitzpatrick,  the  Business 
and  Economics  editor  of  BBC  Northern  Ireland.  He  stated,  “Northern  Ireland  is  suffering  a 
“democratic  overload”  and  needs  a  reworking  of  government  that  prioritizes  the  economy  over 
the  peace  process,”, 
accessed  06  April  2012. 

As  Bob  Ainsworth  (then  Secretary  of  State  for  Defense)  stated  on  1 1  May  2009  as  an  answer  to 
parliamentary  questions,  “There  are  regular  Security  Policy  Meetings  (SPM),  chaired  by 


Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland,  which  discuss  security  arrangements  in  Northern  Ireland” 1  l/text/905 1  lw0028.htm. 

A  distinction  should  be  drawn  early  on  between  figures  for  arrest,  charge  and  conviction. 
Figures  for  arrest  can  appear  very  high,  however  that  will  not  equate  to  convictions.  Section  41  of 
the  Terrorism  Act,  allow  the  police  to  arrest  anyone  they  suspect  of  being  involved  in  terrorism, 
these  suspicions  may  later  be  proven  unfounded.  Even  those  charged  with  terrorist  offences  may 
have  charges  amended  or  dropped  at  a  later  stage.  On  13  May  09  the  Home  Office  Published: 
Statistics  on  Terrorism  Arrests  and  Outcomes  Great  Britain  11  September  2001  to  31  Mar  2008 
(it  does  not  include  Northern  Ireland).  The  report  provided  a  full  statistical  breakdown  of  arrests, 
charges  convictions  and  sentences  and  showed  a  conviction  rate  of  13%  of  which  only  just  over 
half  were  eventually  convicted  for  the  offences  charged  or  like  offences.  Horgan  &  Morrison, 
2011,  calculated  that  for  Northern  Ireland,  of  641  individuals  involved  in  dissident  activity,  181 
were  classified  as  convicted:  that  is,  a  confirmed  conviction  for  illegal  activity  in  the  context  of 
involvement  in  a  dissident  Republican  movement  (that  is  28%).  Most  of  these  have  been  from 
RIRA  and  CIRA  affiliation.  From  the  PSNI  statistics  for  2011  under  Section  41  of  the  Terrorism 
Act  alone  it  is  2 1  %. 

Procedure  in  NI  is  broadly  similar  to  that  in  England  and  Wales  however  there  is  a  fundamental 
difference  at  the  committal  stage.  In  Northern  Ireland  a  Magistrate  first  assesses  the  case.  If  there 
is  a  case  to  answer  it  is  then  referred  to  the  Crown  Court  or  it  is  dismissed.  The  defense  can  call 
witnesses  at  the  committal  stage  and  test  the  strength  of  the  case  and  credibility  of  witnesses. 

This  is  a  critical  failing  for  terrorism  cases,  especially  where  there  is  a  delicate  balance  of 
protecting  information  and  capabilities  in  the  interests  of  National  Security. 

This  was  recognized  as  early  as  May  2000  in  a  joint  letter  developed  by  the  British  Prime 
Minister  Tony  Blair  and  Irish  Prime  Minister  Bertie  Ahem.  They  publicly  pledged  “to  take 
measures  that  facilitate  the  reintegration  of  prisoners  into  the  community,  and  to  address  related 

Over  the  next  four  years,  34  UK  (including  NI)  terrorist-related  prisoners  will  reach  their 
release  dates.  It  is  vital  that  the  transition  of  these  individuals  into  the  community,  and  their 
subsequent  supervision  manages  the  risks  they  may  pose.  There  must  be  a  continuing  joint 
activity  between  the  National  Offender  Management  Service  (NOMS),  the  police  and  other 
agencies  to  ensure  that  risk  is  effectively  managed.  Terrorist  and  terrorism-related  offenders  must 
continue  to  be  subjected  to  Multi  Agency  Public  Protection  Arrangements  (MAPPA),  a  statutory 
set  of  arrangements  in  which  the  police,  prison  and  probation  services  are  required  to  work 
together  to  assess  and  manage  high  risk  offenders.  As  of  Febmary  2011  there  were  36  terrorist 
offenders  managed  under  MAPPA  across  the  UK. 

As  Paul  Nolan  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Peace  Monitoring  Report,  “while  the  Northern  Ireland 
Executive  has  pledged  in  its  draft  Program  for  Government  20 1 1  - 1 5  to  bring  forward  a  new  draft 
of  Cohesion,  Sharing  and  Integration,  it  is  not  expected  that  there  will  be  a  resource  commitment 
that  will  match  that  which  Northern  Ireland  has  enjoyed  from  European  and  American  funders.” 

James  Dingley,  “Northern  Ireland  and  the  Troubles,”  Combatting  Terrorism  in  Northern 
Ireland,  ed.James  Dingley  (New  York,  United  States:  Routledge,  2009),  30. 

Wilsey,  175. 

Jonathon  Evans,  16  Sep  10. 

Wilsey,  ix. 

Operation  BANNER,  An  Analysis  of  Military  Operations  in  Northern  Ireland,,  (Army  Code 
71842,  July  2006).  accessed  06  April  2012. 

Edwards,  18. 


Baron  Hunt,  Report  of  the  Advisory  Committee  on  Police  in  Northern  Ireland  (Her  Majesty’s 
Stationary  Office  (HMSO),  United  Kingdom:  3  October  1969). 

Edwards,  43. 

CAIN  Web  Service,  Sinn  Fein  Ard  Fheis  1-2  November  1986,,  accessed  06  April  2012. 

Jonathon  Evans,  16  Sep  10. 

Edwards,  17. 

Wilsey,  107. 

'“Wilsey,  149. 

Wilsey,  122. 

Tonge,  196. 

CAIN  Web  Service,  The  Patten  Report  on  Policing:  Summary  of  Recommendations,  accessed  06  April  2012. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  xv. 

Wilsey,  42. 

Some  commentators  suggest  that  the  Belfast  Agreement  in  1998  was  the  Sunningdale 
Initiative  “for  dummies!” 

Aughey,  55. 

Cox,  Guelke,  Stephen,  ed.,  “A  farewell  to  arms?  From  ‘long  war’  to  long  peace  in  Northern 
Ireland,”  (Manchester,  United  Kingdom:  Manchester  University  Press,  2000),  Appendix  10. 
Fisher  &  Ury,  86. 

HM  Government,  “CONTEST:  The  United  Kingdom ’s  strategy  for  countering  terrorism,  ” 
(The  Stationary  Office:  July,  2011),  27. 

PSNI,  “Security  Related  Incidents,  ”  related  incidents  cy.pdf,  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

PSNI,  “Security  Related  Incidents,  ”  cy.pdf.  (accessed  06 
April  2012). 

PSNI,  “Security  Related  Incidents,  ”  cy.pdf,  (accessed  06 
April  2012). 

Northern  Ireland  Office,  “Northern  Ireland  Terrorism  Eegislation:  Annual  Statistics 
2009/2010,”  Northern  Ireland  Statistics  and  Research  Agency,  ireland  terrorism  legislation  annual  statistics  2009-2010.pdf, 

accessed  06  April  2012. 

John  Horgan,  and  John  F.  Morrison,  “Here  to  Stay?  The  Rising  Threat  of  Violent  Dissident 
Republicanism  in  Northern  Ireland.  ”  (Terrorism  and  Political  Violence,  no  23:4  ,201 1),  646. 
John  Horgan,  and  John  F.  Morrison,  651. 

Horgan,  647. 

Horgan,  649. 

Belfast  Telegraph,  “Dissidents  pose  less  of  a  threat  as  splits  widen,  ”, 
January  3,  2012, 
of-a-threat-as-splits-widen-16098050.html,  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

CAIN  Web  Service,  Malcolm  Sutton  -  An  Index  of  Deaths  from  the  Conflict  in  Ireland,  Summarv.html.  accessed  06  April  2012. 

CAIN  Web  Service,  Malcolm  Sutton  -  An  Index  of  Deaths  from  the  Conflict  in  Ireland  -  14 
July  1969  -  31  December  2001,  Summarv.html, 
accessed  06  April  2012. 

M.  F.  R.  Smith,  Fighting  for  Ireland  -  The  Military  Strategy  for  the  Irish  Republican 
Movement  (New  York,  United  States:  Routledge,  1995),  1. 

Edwards,  40. 


‘^^Wilsey,  111. 

Wilsey,  112. 

Jonathon  Evans,  “The  Threat  to  National  Security,”  Address  at  the  Worshipful  Company  of 
Security  Professionals  by  the  Director  General  of  the  Security  Service,  16  September  2010. 
MacGinty  &  Darby,  22. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  23. 

Toby  Hamden,  “Libyan  arms  helped  the  IRA  to  wage  war,”  The  Telegraph,  April  04,  2011, 
to-wage-war.html  (accessed  06  April  2012). 

The  IRA  targeted  Downing  Street,  London  Stock  Exchange  and  Heathrow  in  between  the 
1994  and  1996  ceasefires. 

Edwards,  71. 

Edwards,  72. 

Nolan,  16. 

Arthur  Aughey,  The  Politics  of  Northern  Ireland  -  Beyond  the  Belfast  Agreement  (Oxford, 
United  Kingdom:  Routledge,  2005),  57. 

Edwards,  15. 

'^'’Edwards,  19. 

Taylor,  Loyalists. 

Sir  John  Stevens,  ''Stevens  Enquiry  3  -  Overview  &  Recommendations,  ”  ireland/03/stephens  inquiry/pdf/stephens  inquiry. 

pdf  released  on  April  17,  2003. 

MacGinty  &  Darby,  24. 

'^“Wilsey,  130. 

Aughey,  55. 

Fisher  &  Ury,  5. 

Operation  BANNER,  An  Analysis  of  Military  Operations  in  Northern  Ireland,,  (Army  Code 
71842,  July  2006). 

Edwards,  34. 

Wilsey,  50. 

Wilsey,  87. 

Wilsey,  104. 

Peter  Taylor,  Brits:  The  War  Against  the  IRA  (BBC2,  United  Kingdom:  2002). 

Operation  BANNER,  5-14. 

Edwards,  86. 

Taylor,  The  Brits. 

Taylor,  The  Brits.